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“Bâtis ta maison toi-même et brûle-la toi-même.” 
 
—Marcel Schwob (Le Livre de Monelle) 
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Introduction 
 
“Forgive me if I linger on the first Mystery of the House,” Emily Dickinson writes to 
a friend in late January of 1875. Her father had just died, leaving Emily, her sister Lavinia, 
and her elderly mother alone in the familial home. The first mystery of the house. One has the 
sense from Dickinson’s letter that upon the absence of her father, something had changed in 
the house. The alteration seems not to be overwhelmingly baleful or melancholy in 
character, but simply peculiar. The angles of the familiar had shifted. Edward Dickinson’s 
death had introduced a new phase of existence—its conclusion—into a sphere where this 
truth had not yet been known. In The Poetics of Space, an analysis of the phenomenology of 
intimate places, Gaston Bachelard writes, “For our house is the corner of the world. As has 
often been said, it is our first universe, a real cosmos in every sense of the word” (Bachelard 
4). From a position of subjectivity, the universe is composed of the layers of systems that 
concentrically wrap the individual, each system seeming to grow larger, fuller, and more 
complicated. Yet, when we consider that our comprehension of this expansion radiates from 
the center, the smallest point – the human mind, our conception of size changes. All of a 
sudden it is we who are the largest, we, whose capacity for vastness is the most. As the house 
composes the first layer around the individual, this space gains a certain immensity that is 
second only to our own. Dickinson’s father’s death changed something in her, but since the 
house is the first extension of our selves, this change was manifested not only 
psychologically, but also in space. Bachelard writes: 
Thus, an immense cosmic house is a potential of every dream of houses. 
Winds radiate from its center and gulls fly from its windows. A house that is 
as dynamic as this allows the poet to inhabit the universe. Or, to put it 
differently, the universe comes to inhabit his house. (50) 
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The first mystery of the house is the mystery of the familiar. It is the paradox inherent in 
things and places we come to know very well. This, perhaps, is why Dickinson lingers. The 
house, the most controllable layer of the “non-me” systems that contain “me,” is the most 
deceptive one for this reason exactly. I look at my dishes, at my furniture, at my linens, and 
they are things I know so well it is as if they were a part of me. Their ordering is as familiar 
to me as the ordering of my own body—yet, they are not of my body or of my self. This line 
of comfortable thinking contains another false assumption: that our selves are something we 
know. If the individual’s capacity for vastness is the largest of all, the self is infinite and 
inexhaustibly undiscoverable. We linger in our houses to experience a state without 
conclusion. To linger suggests the prolonging of presence beyond the primacy of action or 
purpose. The house is one of the few external spaces where the individual encounters at least 
some freedom from “doing” things. Outside of our own skin, the house is one of the only 
places where it is permissible to simply exist. This space draws our attention away from the 
chatter of everyday obligations and invites us to ask what being is. Who are we when we are 
being? What does that look like?  
 For these questions, for the pondering of mystery, Dickinson apologizes. Forgive me if 
I linger. This apology suggests the conflict on which this examination of consciousness and 
domestic space is centered. While the domestic space is naturally one of the only spaces in 
which the human being is free to “be” and freed from “doing,” the role of women within 
these spaces has been culturally defined as an endless litany of externally-imposed action and 
responsibility. In the 19th century, as the arrival of the industrial revolution carved out 
“separate spheres,” the domestic space became fundamentally gendered as a woman’s space, 
and she became responsible for its presentation. In Inexpressible Privacy, Milette Shamir 
performs an extensive socio-literary analysis of the gendered and spatial division of the 
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nineteenth-century American home, from parlors to studies. Shamir writes, “From Emerson 
to Gaston Bachelard, the study is conceived as a space designed for indulging aspects of 
one’s being that are beyond the limits of discipline, performance, and the linear narratives of 
self-fashioning” (48). Yet Shamir emphasizes that the study was typically a man’s domain, 
and that the solitary freedom that the study afforded had no female equivalent in the 19th 
century house. Parlors, the women’s domain, were places of sociability and performance. 
“As liberal individualism began to define personhood in terms of inviolability and 
solitariness, the bourgeois woman, defined in opposition to these terms, was thereby 
deprived of full personhood” (41). If we consider the intimacy offered by houses to be one 
of their most important qualities, 19th century women were essentially homeless, even within 
the finest houses. Gaston Bachelard writes: 
The house is one of the greatest powers of integration for the thoughts, the 
memories, the dreams of mankind. […] Without it, man would be a 
dispersed being. It maintains him through the storms of the heavens and 
through those of life. It is body and soul. It is the human being’s first world. 
(6-7) 
 
For Bachelard, the house is a retreat, a private extension of the self that facilitates a degree of 
comfort and solitude that fosters reverie, amplified consciousness, and ideal conditions for 
written expression. Especially for women who aspire to create, to dream, and to think, the 
cultural boundaries imposed upon the house and the woman’s capacity within the house do 
nothing to help her realize the creative environment the home potentially affords. This is the 
problem Virginia Woolf famously addresses half a century later in A Room of Her Own, a 
treatise on the conditions required to transform domestic space into creative space for the 
woman author. Reflecting on the tradition of women’s exclusion from private and 
intellectual refuges, Woolf writes, “I thought of the organ booming in the chapel and of the 
shut doors of the library; and I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought 
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how it is worse perhaps to be locked in” (24). Locked in. If one examines a collection of 
American women’s writings from the nineteenth century, the expectation of a nearly sacred 
domestic interiority is overwhelming. Domestic fiction, “women’s fiction”, housekeeping 
guides for women and girls, moral novels, and sentimental fiction: each of these has at its 
root the house as a sanctuary, the family as followers, and the wife as a priestess 
exemplifying the practice of virtue within this interior world.  
The essays that compose this project are about Emily Dickinson, the work of Louisa 
May Alcott and Elizabeth Stoddard, and Housekeeping by Marilynne Robinson. Each chapter 
portrays women authors and their characters working within the parameters of defined 
spaces in order to subvert structures—both cultural and linguistic. These works challenge 
our conceptions of what composes livable space, and whether creative spaces can be 
generated under the most regimented conditions. Where walls are erected and boundaries 
distinguished, these authors ask us to look to the inward infinitude of language and the 
possibility that perception grants when actual conditions limit.  
Perhaps the strongest and most influential character in this project is the subject of 
the first chapter, Emily Dickinson. Dickinson’s enigmatic person embodies the complete 
domestic paradox on which these essays hinge. I begin this exploration with a chapter 
dedicated to the intensity of the poet’s lifelong relationship with words. Dickinson chose to 
live in way that was compulsively solitary. She exercised a kind of domestic monasticism that 
allowed for language to take precedence over all aspects of daily life, while at the same time 
relying upon the seclusion and constraint of the home as barriers against which she pushed 
herself into new internal depths. Through Dickinson’s poetry, I examine the possibility of 
language to transform from inert symbol into vivified images. This chapter begins to 
investigate the role that language plays in our experiences, and suggests that the internal 
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immensity made conscious through poetic language is itself as rich an experience as any 
offered by physical and external events. 
 Dickinson brings up the idea of language as “play,” and this is where the second 
chapter begins. In Chapter Two, I relate and juxtapose two 19th century novels, Little Women 
by Louisa May Alcott and The Morgesons by Elizabeth Stoddard. This is a chapter on 
intermediate spaces, both the threshold space of adolescence as a place between girlhood 
and womanhood, and the role of play as a transitional space necessary to mediate the 
external and internal worlds of the individual. The concept of play brings up issues of 
control in domestic settings—how a woman can exercise her own agency within an 
unmalleable system of rigid expectations. Using Little Women, I explore the “role” of the wife 
and mother as a theatrical construction and address the fantasy of an existence perfectly 
balanced between control and compliance. The Morgesons, conversely offers a wild and 
strange imbalance that shifts the space of play from the actions of the characters to the 
language of the author. Where Alcott focuses on using play to construct the role of women 
within the home to the extent that artificiality becomes an issue, Stoddard uses play as a 
force of destruction directed at both conventional storytelling and the cultural institution of 
domesticity. In The Morgesons, the internal imaginative act engages with the external world, 
emphasizing the generative potential of language initially encountered in Dickinson.  
 The project concludes in the late twentieth century with a novel written by Marilynne 
Robinson in 1980, Housekeeping. In writing Housekeeping, Robinson claims to be contributing 
to a conversation on human consciousness started in the 1850’s by the authors of the 
American Renaissance. Robinson’s novel returns to an issue that greatly concerned 
Dickinson, the relationship between events and our perceptions of them. In Housekeeping, we 
are asked to consider our experience of existence in two ways: one in which we are a 
 8 
fragment of a greater whole that remains veiled to us, and the other in which we are wholes 
unto ourselves—fragments knit together by an ability to bind our perceptions in language. In 
embracing this capacity, the individual plays as large a role in writing her history and 
future—ultimately her identity—as the external events over which she can exert little, if any, 
control. The setting of Housekeeping is a familial home in a small Idaho town in the mid 
twentieth century. For the women around whom the novel centers, the presence of 
household flotsam is pervasive. Subjecting ordinary households things to questions of 
consciousness, memory, and storytelling lends the domestic quotidian a mystical presence 
that makes it feel as if we were seeing it for the first time.  
  In the New York Times Review of Books, Marilynne Robinson discusses her interest in 
reviving the concerns of authors like Emerson, Melville, Thoreau, and Dickinson: 
Nothing appeals to me more than the rigor with which they fasten on 
problems of language, or consciousness – bending form to their purposes, 
ransacking ordinary speech and common experience, […] always, to borrow 
a phrase from Wallace Stevens, in the act of finding what will suffice. I think 
they must have believed everything can be apprehended truly when seen in 
the light of an esthetic understanding appropriate to itself, whence their 
passion for making novel orders of disparate things. I believe they wished to 
declare the intrinsic dignity of all experience and to declare the senses bathed 
in revelation – true, serious revelation, the kind that terrifies. (“Hum Inside 
the Skull” 30) 
 
The experiences of Melville out to sea, or Thoreau in the woods seem to invite explorations 
of consciousness. It is my belief that the home, for its ordinariness and utilitarianism, has 
been overlooked as an important locus of imaginative potential—especially for women. The 
house, for all its structure “[takes] into account our need for retreat and expansion, for 
simplicity and magnificence” (Bachelard 65). The works that compose this project all insist 
on this with a quiet aggression. Their houses are not only spaces of domestic activity, but 
spaces of language activated by a need for expression and expansion. These women exercise 
a capacity to make room for their thoughts where none was given. In creating their own 
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spaces, they’re often required to destroy certain already-established cultural spaces, and this 
cycle of formation and obliteration reclaims and revitalizes the domestic environment.  
 As the reader enters into this discussion of the role of language, consciousness and 
identity within domestic spaces, I would like to suggest that I did not choose this 
combination of authors as much as they chose each other. Besides their collective 
womanhood and respective peculiar relationships to the domestic environment, each author 
brings a specific and necessary piece to this conversation that the others respond to in hints 
and echoes. The reality of subjectivity is a long-standing question of the freedom, agency, 
and power of the human mind that has not ceased to be relevant in the twenty-first century. 
The subject is pressing, and the question perhaps unsolvable, but we engage with it because 
it persists from an essential human core that “fact” does not assuage and time does not 
annul. 
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Chapter I 
 
“A Prison Gets to be a Friend”:  
Emily Dickinson and the Possibility of Structures 
 
 
Emily Dickinson’s person has held as much allure as her work in the American 
literary tradition. Authoring more than 1700 poems and hundreds of letters, she died with no 
intention of publishing either body. Undoubtedly, part of the interest in her work stems 
from a visceral curiosity about the secret genius of the woman behind the closed door. The 
radical nature of her poetry is extraordinary when one considers the cultural odds against 
her. As a woman of nineteenth century America, her path was one of clear domestic 
expectations. Dickinson’s father, a legacy of Puritan rigidity, enforced this position within his 
family intransigently, and discouraged the Dickinson women from participating in all outside 
activities except those pertaining to education. This strong medicine of submission and 
seclusion without question made an impact on the young poet— who would later act out 
both themes to pathological extremes in her life and in various configurations throughout 
her poems.  
However, to insist that Dickinson’s seclusion removed her entirely from her time as 
a disembodied poetic voice untouched by the America into which she was born, would be to 
overlook the evidence that places her firmly within the American canon. In truth, Dickinson 
lived within one of the most fanatic, electric, physically destructive, and creatively 
invigorating eras in American history. Born into the religious fervor of the Second Great 
Awakening into a family with stringent Puritanical ideas of gender roles and familial 
structure, from childhood on, Dickinson was constantly under the scrutiny and pressure of a 
deeply religious community. Her life witnessed the mounting acts of political tension and 
violence that would eventually culminate in the unspeakably horrific Civil War. Some of her 
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countrymen and women went west with an uncurbed desire for the opportunity which 
unclaimed untamed space provided, and less than 100 miles away Concord’s intellectuals 
were circulating a doctrine of transcendentalism that would philosophically come to define 
the intellectual climate of the period. Damming the flow of this energy would have been 
impossible, and when we look at Dickinson’s work in comparison to literary contemporaries 
like Hawthorne, Thoreau, Emerson, Melville, and Whitman—a motley conglomeration of 
genius that would later be heralded as representing the “American Renaissance”—it is 
eminently clear that the energy of the times joins these writers in ways they could not have 
anticipated. The question remains: with such an excess of activity occurring in the world 
outside, how did Dickinson—who might seem doubly unpromising as both a woman and a 
recluse—gain access to the reserves of philosophical and aesthetic radicalism that definitively 
announces her inestimable, and often confounding, contribution to American poetics?  
The answer is both a contradiction and the logical alternative. Whether it is a result 
of her limitations or her own compulsion to exist internally, it is the interior world that 
possesses Dickinson. Shrouded in the mystery of her self-enforced exile, Dickinson’s work 
abounds with the paradoxes of a woman trying to break the boundaries imposed by her 
society not through exodus, but by retreating deep within it. To read Dickinson’s work is to 
trace the subversive threads that tie together confinement and freedom, dependency and 
self-reliance, nearness and distance, and desire and affirmation. Attempting to point to 
Dickinson’s poetry as an exemplification of any one locus along the spectrum is entirely 
useless, so intricate are the verbal, psychological, and philosophical weavings of her poetry. 
And yet, for an author whose work embodies so many complexities, Dickinson’s poems are 
deceptively unassuming in size and aesthetic. 
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However, for their comparatively modest circumference, the poems spiral with 
infinite depth to an unknown, unplumbable center. Gaston Bachelard, author of The Poetics of 
Space, writes “If we want to determine man’s being, we are never sure of being closer to 
ourselves if we ‘withdraw’ into ourselves, if we move toward the center of the spiral; for 
often it is in the heart of being that being is errancy” (Bachelard 215). The closer we 
approach the heart of a Dickinson poem, the vaster it becomes—and only through the 
reader’s sense of an increasingly uncharitable amplitude do we come to intuit Dickinson’s 
meaning. But if the heart of the poem is unreachable, and the circumference is modest, 
where can we begin to understand poetry intentionally constructed to elude understanding? 
The evasiveness of the poet is far from malicious, at times it is even playful—but once 
embarked on the insular sea of a Dickinson poem, one cannot help but feel that the poet 
intentionally side-stepping understanding at every turn of the spiral. Without a true 
beginning from which to start, and with no linear path to follow, even the softest treading of 
“simple” examination has a way of breaking through the surface into unanticipated vastness. 
We will encounter this first hand as we use Dickinson’s relationship to words as a point of 
entry. By looking at her complex relationship to language, the tensions of her themes, and 
the imaginative spaces she explores and creates, this essay attempts to place the disparate 
voices of Dickinson in conversation with one another and with the reader, finding creative 
power within the paradox.  
Words—the smallest common denominator, the atoms of language, and the bricks 
of the literary house—ought to be simple. A fully constructed house is impossible to lift, but 
the single brick can be held and examined with ease. This is not always the case with words. 
Can we still look to the smallness of their unit, or the manageability of their size when we 
consider that for Dickinson, words were everything? How much more unwieldy they seem 
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to become with the realization that she chose to conduct her entire life through this medium. 
From her bedroom, she wrote to family, friends, acquaintances, and for herself. Her poetic 
missives were the form in which she chose to visit, to touch, and to share. When others went 
calling, Dickinson corresponded, and these epistolary ropes are what anchored her to her 
community socially. Likewise, the hundreds of fascicles that she bound and kept for herself 
acted as the “Glass/ Across my mouth – it blurs it – / Physician’s – proof of Breath” (470, 
6-8) an affirmation of her own existence. It is in words that Dickinson lived, and through 
her that words became enlivened. 
       However, this relationship was an obsessive and contradictory one. For Dickinson, 
words were capable of everything and nothing. Words have a strange power: through them 
one can create and be created, but to achieve everything, one runs the risk of ending up with 
nothing: destruction, reduction, and deadness. In spite of this, the space between vivification 
and coagulation is where possibility lies, and from this central vantage point Dickinson has 
full view of the spectrum of possibility. The line one walks between realizing the delirious 
desirability of words’ full potential and experiencing the hollowness of their limitations is the 
polarized existence that engages Dickinson, and the place that she occupies both 
thematically and structurally in her poems.  
“I dwell in Possibility,” begins one of her poems. For Dickinson, nothing is more 
appealing than to view the alternatives—to see the open doors, and to have them: to keep 
them all in a row and in sight. It is connected to her vitality. We are never more alive than 
when we desire something. For most, desire ebbs and flows; it comes in cycles of wanting 
and having and wanting again. Desire mounts and rises slowly up an incline toward the 
moment of satisfaction at which point one possesses the object of desire and the movement 
upwards—the progress, the drive, the vitality—temporarily disappears.  The French, in 
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reference to the sexual nature of this cycle call the orgasm, the moment of dropping-off, le 
petit mort, or “the little death” and it is a good phrase to keep in mind for Dickinson because 
death represents the total loss that Dickinson fears in attainment. How much more alive we 
are when there is something left to want.  
Who never wanted – maddest Joy 
Remains to him unknown – 
The Banquet of Abstemiousness 
Defaces that of Wine – 
 
Within its reach, though yet ungrasped 
Desire’s perfect Goal – 
No nearer – lest the Actual – 
Should disenthrall thy soul – (1430) 
 
In this poem, “maddest joy” is a banquet laid before Dickinson within easy reach. To 
partake would entail enjoying all the pleasures of experience, but eventually ends with 
satiation, the process of becoming full and never again recovering that original hunger that 
points so overwhelmingly to the one object. By refraining, she never has to know the lull of 
satiation, and the original longing remains sharp, clear, and vital. We can also consider the 
way in which Dickinson describes desire and abstemiousness in regards to her relationship 
with language.  
In “Literature and the Right to Death,” Maurice Blanchot discusses the power and 
necessity of language to negate and re-birth the “real things” they represent. Blanchot writes: 
What is the author capable of? Everything—first of all, everything: he is 
fettered, he is enslaved, but as long as he can find a few moments of freedom 
in which to write, he is free to create a world without slaves, a world in which 
the slaves become the masters and formulate a new law; thus, by writing, the 
chained man immediately obtains freedom for himself and for the world; he 
denies everything he is in order to become everything he is not. In this sense, 
his work is a prodigious act, the greatest and more important there is. But let 
us examine this more closely. Insofar as he immediately gives himself the 
freedom he does not have, he is neglecting the actual conditions for his 
emancipation, he is neglecting to do the real thing that must be done so that 
the abstract idea of freedom can be realized. (315) 
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We can connect Dickinson’s propensity for desire over satisfaction to Blanchot’s distinction 
between writing and actual conditions. When we desire something, everything is possible—it 
is only in the reaching for it that we may be hindered. Likewise, Blanchot goes on to say that 
when the author writes “he makes all of reality available to us,” but “he possesses only the 
infinite; he lacks the finite, limit escapes him” (316).  The author always chooses the banquet 
of abstemiousness, because it is the only feast that is infinitely sustainable. Blanchot, like 
Dickinson, addresses the paradox that through writing we can have everything our hearts 
desire—as long as we know that we can never really have it. But is “living in possibility” an 
inherently creative act, in which the real world is substituted for a world made of language? 
Or is it an inherently destructive one, in which something real is negated for its deadened 
representation? 
In many Dickinson poems, the emphasis is on the creation. Dickinson may turn 
away from the world, but the focus remains on what she turns to in its place.  
The Missing All – prevented Me 
From missing minor Things. 
If nothing larger than a World’s  
Departure from a Hinge – 
Or Sun’s extinction, be observed – 
‘Twas not so large that I 
Could lift my Forehead from my work 
For Curiosity.  (985) 
 
This poem illustrates Dickinson’s abstemiousness, as she turns from the All— Blanchot’s 
“world of actual conditions”—to face her writing. The poem expresses that the missing 
everything in total prevents Dickinson from the distraction of the ordinary cares and losses 
of life that keep one anchored in actual reality. For Blanchot, this total renunciation amounts 
to an annihilation of the world that is necessary for the author to generate her own world. 
Blanchot writes: 
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The realm of the imaginary is not a strange region situated beyond the world, 
it is the world itself, but the world as entire, manifold, the world as a whole. 
That is why it is not in the world, because it is the world, grasped and 
realized in its entirety by the global negation of all the individual realities 
contained in it, by their disqualification, their absence, by the realization of 
that absence itself, which is how literary creation begins, for when literary 
creation goes back over each thing and each being, it cherishes the illusion 
that is creating them, because now it is seeing and naming them from the 
starting point of everything, from the starting point of the absence of 
everything, that is, from nothing. (316) 
 
The “minor Things” that compose the “All” are Blanchot’s individual realities, the un-
catalogued, ungraspable number of components that make up the world before it is 
destroyed and recreated through language. Refuge from the infinite multiplicity of the 
realities of the world seems to be partially the appeal of writing for Dickinson. The scale of 
the All is so huge that it is impossible to hold it. Language, in its ability to unify the world 
through individual perception, makes the world accessible.  
     However, this is not to say that language reduces or simplifies what it recreates. 
When Dickinson is submerged in her language outside the world, nothing short of cataclysm 
could induce her to return to actual conditions. Though she is creator, the sense of wonder 
present in the actual world of uncontrollable conditions is not absent from the world of 
language. Language maintains its mystery and its magic, even though the process of creation 
implies control.  
 One of the most important aspects of this magic is the way in which words progress 
from signifiers of images to vivified images. A fully constructed house, while still composed 
of basic elements, becomes more than itself. It exists not only as many small bricks stacked 
together, but a place to be lived in and understood as more than the sum of its parts. With 
language, we do this as well; we use verbal materials to create images that become more than 
the materials. The words expand to become embellished images of recreated life.  
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Make me a picture of the sun – 
So I can hang it in my room – 
And make believe I’m getting warm 
When others call it “Day”! 
 
Draw me a Robin – on a stem – 
So I am hearing him, I’ll dream, 
And when the Orchards stop their tune – 
Put my pretense – away – 
 
Say if it’s really – warm at noon – 
Whether it’s Buttercups – that “skim” – 
Or Butterflies – that “bloom”? 
Then – skip – the frost – upon the lea – 
And skip the Russet – on the tree – 
Let’s play those – never come! (188) 
 
Make believe, dream, pretense, play: these are the powerful forces of the imagination that 
Dickinson puts into action when she writes. In this poem, the poet creates the world inside 
her room; sometimes her creations imitate the actuality of the world outside, and other times 
there is pleasure in knowing that through “play”—and though language—those unfavorable 
elements like the chill of the frost, or the ominous redness of leaves that predict winter, can 
be thwarted and postponed indefinitely. We see her take liberties in the world of her creation 
where buttercups skim and butterflies bloom. This poem has a particular playfulness about it 
that Dickinson emphasizes through the use of words like “make-believe” and “pretense” 
which suggest something childish or whimsical about this game she plays with words. But 
despite the mild self-deprecation, it is not really a game at all. For in choosing the picture of 
the sun over the actual sun, Dickinson affirms the reality of the representation of the thing 
over the thing itself— denying the sovereignty of the actual world in favor of her own. The 
room in which one can hang images to cover the bareness of the wall, images that one can 
almost feel and hear, is a room of possibility, in which anything wanted can be had (as long 
as one never desires to truly feel the sun, or hear the robin), and where the undesirable can be 
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excluded. For Dickinson, to dwell in possibility is to dwell in words, and to experience the 
unlimited generative potential that language makes possible.  
       The nearly supernatural potential of words that she explores with modesty in “Make me 
a picture of the sun,” Dickinson revels in within “I think I was enchanted”: 
I think I was enchanted  
When first a somber Girl – 
I read that Foreign Lady 
The Dark – felt beautiful – 
 
And whether it was noon at night – 
Or only Heaven – at Noon – 
For very Lunacy of Light 
I had not power to tell – (593, 1-8) 
 
Dickinson begins the poem with reference to the poetry of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, 
whom she credits for first enchanting her with words. This poet introduces her to “the 
dark,” or the side of possibility, for the first time. In the dark, in the total absence of images, 
all images are possible. The light of the sun, which evokes the intransient forms of the actual, 
has not yet solidified any images into being or non-being. Nothing is determined or fixed in 
this dark realm of the imaginary; it is beautiful in its potential. This sun, which Dickinson 
calls noon, consummates expectation by fulfilling desire, and consequently causes the world 
to lose the enchantment of potential.  
      The concept of “noon at night,” a recurring theme not unrelated to the parallel 
image-reality in “Make me a picture of the sun,” suggests that through words we create 
images that are just as powerful as the things they represent. The phrase “Lunacy of Light” 
also suggests the moon—the fraternal twin of the defining sun, who, like Dickinson’s sun-
image, both is and, in comparison with the bright light of day, is not a source of light.  
The Bees – became as Butterflies – 
The Butterflies – as Swans – 
Approached – and spurned the narrow Grass – 
And just the meanest Tunes 
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That Nature murmured to herself 
To keep herself in Cheer – 
I took for Giants – practising  
Titanic Opera – (593, 9-16) 
 
One of the powers of imaginative potential is the way in which it allows for expansion. In 
this stanza, what is winged and miniscule grows unchecked until insect lavishly becomes 
waterfowl. Likewise, “the meanest tunes that nature murmured to herself” through the lens 
of language can be reconceptualized until they not only grow from “mean” to “Titanic,” but 
have been organized and recognized as “Opera”—or an aesthetic form. Through language, 
we can process the otherwise objective occurrences of the actual world to give them 
subjective value—or meaning. The next stanza continues, “The Days – to Mighty Metres 
stept – / The Homeliest – adorned” (593, 17-18). Through verbal recreation, words lose any 
sense of smallness and begin to measure the days. Words become the medium through 
which life is experienced, and this experience imbued with meaning makes for a richer life. 
Even the homeliest day is capable of aesthetic transformation.  
        Once this transformation occurs, the verbal element seems to disappear; words become 
lost within the greater image they have created.  
I could not have defined the change –  
Conversion of the Mind 
Like Sanctifying in the Soul – 
Is witnessed – not explained (593, 21-24) 
 
The “change” from the objective actual to the subjective meaningful, which has been 
accomplished solely through the use of language, now resists the very element of which it is 
composed. Because life within the poem can now be seen imaginatively, it defies definition—
a movement back in the direction of the verbal. This property, illustrated clearly in “I think I 
was enchanted” is most crucial to Dickinson. Images both precede and proceed from 
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language. Prior to language exists the objective thing which language will negate— it is the 
ungraspable All, impossible to experience because experience necessitates language. Blanchot 
writes, “Language derives its value and its pride from the fact that it is the achievement of 
this negation; but in the beginning, what was lost? The torment of language is what it lacks 
of the necessity that it be the lack of precisely this. It cannot even name it” (327).  
      In “Make me a picture of the sun,” before the sun is rendered into an image of the 
sun, it cannot be touched or truly experienced from a human perspective because of its 
objective immensity.  Through words we can create an image of the sun with which one can 
have meaningful experiences. This is what Blanchot refers to when he speaks of the illusion 
of creation. When Dickinson denies the superiority of the actual to the image, she starts 
from a point of artificial blankness that allows for creation to occur. The image of the sun all 
at once becomes Dickinson’s sun, created by her, of a certain color, with a certain purpose, 
that retains certain relations to the poet and the rest of the poem—her world. Having begun, 
the progression from the thing, to language, to the subjective meaningful image, can only 
move forward; it cannot move backward to a pre-subjective state. In this system where the 
journey started cannot be returned from, we see how Dickinson’s linguistic game becomes 
more than “play.” The action of writing sets a very real and unrestrained change in motion. 
While the unified imaginative whole may seem to require the shrinking of the actual to make 
immensity comprehensible, it infinitely expands the poet’s capacity to be a part of the world.  
And yet, despite the exuberance of creation expressed in poems like “I think I was 
enchanted,” much of Dickinson’s work conveys the unrelenting anxiety that the writing 
process incurs, and the intrinsic distrust of words. At times, Dickinson seems to fully believe 
that writing poetry unshackles the mind, and in doing so expands our perceptions of the 
world—but this end goal is never certain. In a letter to the editor Thomas Wentworth 
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Higginson she asks, “Mr. Higginson, Are you too deeply occupied to say if my verse is 
alive?” (Selected Letters 171). Dickinson, teetering on a line of paradox again, fears that though 
the living word may represent all possibility, the inadequate word is only capable of 
reduction; instead of expanding from nothing into image, it lingers inert in the wake of its 
destruction, powerless to generate meaning where creation was intended.  
In “A Charm invests a face,” Dickinson hesitates on the threshold of language as she 
describes the fear of losing the mysterious beauty of a face through its unveiling.  
A Charm invests a face 
Imperfectly beheld – 
The Lady dare not lift her Veil 
For fear it be dispelled – 
 
But peers beyond her mesh – 
And wishes – and denies – 
Lest Interview – annul a want 
That Image – satisfies – (421, 1-8) 
 
This poem reminds us of the combative relationship the poet shares with desire and 
attainment. Even words, it seems, can come too close to the thing desired, and might be 
better left unsaid, or unwritten. Dickinson, like a painter, seeks to express the quality of what 
she represents—not capture it with photographic stillness. “A Charm invests a face/ 
Imperfectly beheld –” speaks to the ungraspableness of the world before language, and the 
certain appeal this evasion holds. What retains mystery retains possibility; it should come as 
no surprise that the state before language, the lost beginning which Blanchot argues cannot 
be known or named, appeals to Dickinson. Our wildest hopes for what lies beneath the veil 
must necessarily be more beautiful than anything it obscures. Words, at their worst, are 
capable of lifting the veil of possibility only to replace the unmitigated sweetness of 
possibility with the dullness of what cannot be questioned or changed. What lived unseen 
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dies under the scrutiny that allows for no mystery. Blanchot elaborates on this aspect of 
language: 
For me to be able to say, “This woman,” I must somehow take her flesh-
and-blood reality away from her, cause her to be absent, annihilate her. The 
word gives me the being, but it gives it to me deprived of being. […] Of 
course my language does not kill anyone. And yet, when I say, “This 
woman,” real death has been announced and is present in my language; my 
language means that this person, who is here right now, can be detached 
from herself, removed from her existence and presence, and suddenly 
plunged into a nothingness in which there is no existence of presence; my 
language essentially signifies the possibility of this destruction; it is a 
constant, bold allusion to such an event. (322-3) 
 
Dickinson connects this unveiling with language, as well. The lady denies her unveiling “Lest 
Interview – annul a want –/ That image – satisfies –”. The process of making subjective, 
graspable images becomes a dilemma. The careful verbal examination of the thing rendered 
can place us in too close a proximity; instead of instilling the world of actual conditions with 
a magical playfulness, words have the power to strip the world of its mystery. Words, far 
from liberating, confine the thing in question.  
       This confinement is so deplorable that a fickle Dickinson even seems at times to 
loathe the verbal tools through which she mediates her life. In “You’ll know it – as you 
know ’tis Noon – ” she illustrates this paradox. 
You’ll know it – as you know ’tis Noon – 
By Glory – 
As you do the Sun – 
By Glory – 
As you will in Heaven – 
Know God the Father – and the Son. 
 
By intuition, Mightiest Things 
Assert themselves – and not by terms – 
“I’m Midnight” – need the Midnight say – 
“I’m Sunrise” – Need the Majesty? (420, 1-10) 
 
Now, all the joy of verbal creation seems but a paltry mimicking act. Midnight – the noon we 
create after the annihilation of the day, and the made-image of the sun are viciously disposed 
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of because they can never achieve the glory of what was negated for their sakes. So 
inadequate can words be, that this stanza suggests a type of surrender. God the Father and 
the Son cannot be known until death— Exodus 33:20, “And he said, Thou canst not see my 
face: for there shall no man see me, and live,” likewise Mightiest Things will never be known 
in “terms” or language. Writing amounts to nothing more than a blaspheming of the 
perfection of inexpressible things.  
Omnipotence – had not a Tongue – 
His lisp – is Lightning – and the Sun – 
His Conversation – with the Sea – 
“How shall you know”? 
Consult your Eye! (420, 11-15) 
 
In this stanza, Dickinson implicitly compares her power as a creator to God’s. The 
mediation through words that Dickinson’s creation act requires makes it the inferior of the 
two. God, for Dickinson, requires no mediation: he works directly with images and light. 
Creation and comprehension occur in one pure motion, rather than relying upon the 
derivative process that language necessitates. Before, we explored this derivative process as 
an expansive movement—language creates images, which can be verbalized and imagined 
again. Now, this process only moves us away from the original in all of its perfection. This 
final stanza is beautifully illuminated through a biblical parallel that Blanchot draws in 
“Literature and the Right to death.” Blanchot writes: 
God had created living things, but man had to annihilate them. Not until 
then did they take on meaning for him, and he in turn created them out the 
of the death into which they had disappeared; only instead of beings (êtres) 
and, as we say, existants (existants), there remained only being (l’être), and man 
was condemned not to be able to approach anything or experience anything 
except through the meaning he had to create. (323) 
 
Dickinson explores precisely this idea in a later poem, “Perception of an object costs.” 
 
Perception of an object costs 
Precise the Object’s loss – 
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Perception in itself a Gain 
Replying to its Price – 
 
The Object Absolute – is nought – 
Perception sets it fair 
And then upbraids a Perfectness  
That situates so far – (1071, 1-8) 
 
Dickinson’s “object’s loss” is the same process of annihilation to which Blanchot attributes 
the birth of meaning. However, unlike in “You’ll know it – as you know ‘tis Noon – ”, 
Dickinson acknowledges the intangibility of the Object Absolute for the purposes of human 
comprehension; the quest to understand something without subjecting it to the process of 
understanding is an absurd one. And yet, though Dickinson clearly understands the tragic 
truth that we live in the midst of a desirable world that is impossible to experience except as it 
is mediated by human consciousness, she remains unsatisfied.  “How shall you know?” asks 
contrarian Dickinson: through your eyes. Nothing short of God’s immaculate understanding 
will suffice. A power—God, in this poem and the quotation from Blanchot—created a 
world of actual conditions that lives, and to experience any part of this world necessitates 
that it undergoes the destructive processes of our consciousness, to emerge as a changed 
version of itself. Where once Dickinson celebrated the power of subjectivity—the idea that 
this changed version can be colored and improved upon and played with, she now mourns 
the death of objectivity, the inadequacies of her own power, and the way in which words 
destroy and confine, rather than create and liberate what they represent.  
And yet, though the paradox between the expansive and confining capabilities of 
words is a very real one, we make a mistake in calling these two alternatives opposites, or 
referring to them as mutually exclusive possibilities. We simplify Dickinson’s relationship to 
words (and to the limitations of structure in general) if we cannot maintain a nuanced 
understanding of a crucial point: it is only through confinement by structure that she can 
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access the infinite. For a moment, let us broaden our gaze to encompass not only 
Dickinson’s words, but also her peculiar authorial figure and her relationship to space.  
In his defining 1958 text, The Poetics of Space, French philosopher Gaston Bachelard 
expounds on the phenomenology of houses and the relationship between imagination and 
intimate space. He writes, “[If] I were asked to name the chief benefit of the house, I should 
say: the house shelters daydreaming, the house protects the dreamer, the house allows one to 
dream in peace” (Bachelard 6). No one better illustrates this principle in both a figurative 
and literal way than Dickinson, who secluded herself within structures to foster her creative 
endeavors.1 Through an examination of language as structure and the role structure plays 
within Dickinson’s poems, we begin to understand Dickinson’s particular, peculiar, and 
counterintuitive transcendence.  
 “Before I got my eye put out,” picks up where we left off: exploring the impossibility 
of existing in a world unmediated by language. 
Before I got my eye put out 
I liked as well to see – 
As other Creatures, that have Eyes 
And know no other way – 
 
But were it told to me – Today 
That I might have the sky 
For mine – I tell you that my Heart 
Would split, for size of me – 
 
The meadows – mine – 
The Mountains – mine – 
All Forests – Stintless Stars – 
As much of Noon as I could take 
                                            
1 Biographer of Dickinson, Alfred Habegger, records a telling incident about the imaginative potential of “Aunt 
Emily’s” house as it affected her sister-in-law Susan Gilbert Dickinson and her nephew Gilbert. “Once, when 
little Gilbert was in kindergarten and boasted about a beautiful white calf that proved to be imaginary, his 
teacher reprimanded him for the sin of lying and made him cry. Sue tried to convince the benighted woman of 
the validity of the imagination, but Aunt Emily, as her niece recalled, was too indignant for reasoning and 
‘besought them one and all to come to her, she would show them! The white calf was grazing up in her attic at 
that very moment!’” (Habegger 548).  
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Between my finite eyes – 
 
The Motions of the Dipping Birds – 
The Morning’s Amber Road – 
For mine – to look at when I liked – 
The News would strike me dead – 
 
So safer – guess – with just my soul 
Upon the Window pane – 
Where other Creatures put their eyes – 
Incautious—of the Sun – (327, 1-21) 
 
Aside from the position taken by Blanchot, that a life without structures is an impossible 
dream—this poem (unlike “You’ll know it as you know ‘tis Noon”) illustrates the 
undesirability of the condition of being in possession of the infinitely multitudinous objective 
world. If such a thing were even possible to experience, the kind of immensity that comes 
with Noon is dizzying and vast; though at first it may seem liberating, it would be simply too 
much for mortal experience. Recall, none see God and live. “My heart would split/[…] The 
News would strike me dead.” But this does not necessitate that immensity and its joys are 
forfeit all together. Instead, Dickinson can experience them against the window—or through 
the glass of language. Sensory perception (simply another form of mediation) may be enough 
for some, but Dickinson, who sees the limitations of this mode, has found another way. 
     Bachelard writes, “Through the poet’s window the house converses about immensity 
with the world” (68), and though he refers specifically to spatial structures, we’ll see that this 
idea is intrinsically connected to verbal structures. This quotation from Bachelard only 
mirrors Dickinson’s final point: language, for its elusive quality to both exist and to eradicate 
existence, can be a mediator between what is fixed and rigid and what is fluid and 
ungraspable. It is the window between structure and immensity: it is the pane against which 
we place our soul when we write poetry. Like the paradox of confinement and 
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expansiveness, the paradox of the destructive and creative capabilities of language are 
similarly resolved by Blanchot: 
In this way, [literature] is already uniting two contradictory movements. It is 
negation, because it drives back the inhuman, indeterminate side of things 
back into nothingness; it defines them, makes them finite, and this is the 
sense in which literature is really the work of death in the world. But at the 
same time, after having denied things in their existence, it preserves them in 
their being; it causes things to have a meaning, and the negation which is 
death at work is also the advent of meaning, the activity of comprehension. 
(338) 
 
Yet, while literature unites negation and being—a dead actuality killed by language and the 
living subjective image that follows from it—words are in the fascinating position of not 
only conversing with structure, but also existing inherently as a structure: a structure that 
transcends itself.  
They called me to the Window, for 
“ ‘Twas Sunset” – Some one said – 
I only saw a Sapphire Farm – 
And just a Single Herd – 
 
Of Opal Cattle – feeding far 
Upon so vain a Hill – 
As even while I looked – dissolved – 
Nor Cattle were – nor Soil – 
 
But in their stead – a Sea – displayed – 
And Ships – of such a size 
As Crew of Mountains – could afford – 
And Decks – to seat the skies – 
 
This – too – the Showman rubbed away – 
And when I looked again – 
Nor Farm – nor Opal Herd – was there – 
Nor Mediterranean –  (628, 1-16) 
 
Upon first reading, this poem seems simply to be about Dickinson’s reaction to the fading 
light of dusk and changing image of what she sees before her, but for our purposes, the 
poem here does something more. We begin in a familiar place—with Dickinson at the 
window (at the risk of taking semantic coincidence for granted, we can even think of it as 
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Bachelard’s mediating pane), looking at the sun. From the second line, someone has 
verbalized the thing in question, the sunset. After the condition is named, the images begin 
to flow and shift with the receding light. The sapphire farm, the opal cattle, the sea, the 
ships, the mountains: all of these are contained within the one word, “sunset.” Furthermore, 
none of these are fixedly contained within the word, as evidenced by the absence of 
everything in the final stanza. The word, like the sky, is dark. Nothing is predetermined in 
the verbal realm of possibility.  
 This, for Dickinson, is the beauty of structure. A single word contains the possibility 
of multitudes. We see this in the compact nature of her poems. Bachelard, in writing about 
the adverse affects of tedious and minute description pays tribute to the power of the single, 
artistically chosen word.  
Here the nuance bespeaks the color. A poet’s word, because it strikes true, 
moves the very depths of our being. Over picturesqueness in a house can 
conceal its intimacy. […] The first, the oneirically definitive house, must 
retain its shadows. […] Then I may hope that my page will possess a sonority 
that will ring true – a voice so remote within me, that it will be the voice we 
all hear when we listen as far back as memory reaches, on the very limits of 
memory, beyond memory perhaps, in the field of the immemorial. All we 
communicate to others is an orientation towards what is secret without ever 
being able to tell the secret objectively. (Bachelard 13) 
 
Fitting that the Italian stanza should translate as “room.” Composed of stanzas, 
Dickinson poems are little house entities unto themselves, seemingly small and concrete but 
with a vast potential for the creation of dream space, pockets in which images are born. 
Consider the dashes and seemingly arbitrary capitalizations that freckle her poems. Are these 
not attempts to create space within the poem? The dash seems to pull the word out farther 
from itself without ever specifying the extension; the capital magnifies the word in 
importance or emphasis so that its capacity to hold images expands. If Dickinson’s poems 
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are houses, they are anthills. Through the single opening above ground—the single word—
one can descend down into myriad passages and infinite chambers. 
But this is more than a verbal capability. Dickinson exemplifies this tendency—
expansion through confinement—with her entire being. I’ve used the word “transcend” to 
describe the movement from words to images that takes place within her poems. 
Considering the forceful intellectual energy of Dickinson’s contemporary moment, 
transcendence is a loaded term associated primarily with the philosophies and writings of 
Emerson, Thoreau, Fuller and Alcott. Dickinson was aware of the transcendentalist school 
of thought, and though she never self-identified with transcendentalist ideals, there are ways 
in which her work and her practices have been drastically under-appreciated as both a 
fascinating component of and a gendered counterpart to transcendentalist philosophy.  
     Dickinson was an admirer of both Emerson and Thoreau2, but it is especially interesting 
to investigate her strange, symmetrical, yet nearly inverted sympathy with the latter. 
Biographer Alfred Habegger recounts, “When a new acquaintance happened to quote 
Thoreau, she ‘hastened to press her visitor’s hand as she said, ‘From this time we are 
acquainted’” (518). Dickinson’s attraction to Thoreau’s work should not surprise, for these 
two seemingly opposite figures are far more alike than history has allowed for recognition. 
Both were truly radical thinkers attempting to live on the margin of a society to which they 
were not reconciled—however, each went about the enactment of these ideas in a way nearly 
opposite from the other.  
                                            
2  “Success,” one of the few Dickinson poems anonymously published in The Literary World at the request of 
others was mistakenly attributed to Emerson in 1878. Additionally, Biographer, Alfred Habegger suggests that 
the opening line of Dickinson’s “’Twas fighting for his Life he was – ” may be a reference to H.D.T. (500) 
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      The importance of the creative expansion that Dickinson was experiencing in the act of 
writing can really be emphasized if we draw a parallel to Thoreau’s well-regarded essay, 
“Walking.”  Thoreau writes: 
Eastward I go only by force; but westward I go free. Thither no business 
leads me. It is hard for me to believe that I shall find fair landscapes or 
sufficient wildness and freedom behind the eastern horizon. I am not excited 
by the prospect of a walk thither; but I believe that the forest which I see in 
the western horizon stretches uninterruptedly toward the setting sun, and 
there are no towns nor cities in it of enough consequence to disturb me. Let 
me live where I will, on this side is the city, on that the wilderness, and ever I 
am leaving the city more and more, and withdrawing into the wilderness. 
(668) 
 
Several paragraphs later he concludes, “The West of which I speak is but another name for 
the Wild; and what I have been preparing to say is, that in Wildness is the preservation of the 
World” (672). The idea that human beings need unexplored, uninhabited space, and that 
possibility exists in what has not yet been known or defined is precisely the idea that we’ve 
been exploring through Dickinson’s words—yet Thoreau’s version of this quest, seeking 
expansion through external movement westward, is the masculine and more instinctive 
model of this very American desire, and has become a dominant narrative voice where 
Dickinson’s has not been fully acknowledged.  
 Dickinson, in expressing a similar desire for possibility, moves not outward but 
inward. Hers is the photographic negative of the Thoreau narrative, and because she is a 
woman and because the setting of this inverted movement toward immensity is a domestic 
one, Dickinson’s own narrative of expansion is an important “feminine” counterpoint to the 
traditionally masculine narrative of exploration. Thoreau finds the external movement 
outward essential. Dickinson, without ever leaving her room can go just as far, if not farther, 
inward. Bachelard writes of intimate immensity:  
Immensity is within ourselves. It is attached to a sort of expansion of being 
that life curbs and caution arrests, but which starts again when we are alone. 
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As soon as we become motionless, we are elsewhere; we are dreaming in a 
world that is immense. Indeed, immensity is the movement of motionless 
man. (184) 
 
The image of a spiral is especially apt for Dickinson. Though the circumference of her 
circumspect life and poems is measured on the outside—a woman, a spinster, a stanza, a 
rhyme—she travels profound distances within her mind and finds this form of voyaging to 
be truer. In “Experience is the angled road,” she makes an argument for the Dickinsonian 
model.  
Experience is the Angled Road 
Preferred against the Mind 
By – Paradox – the Mind itself – 
Presuming it to lead 
 
Quite Opposite – How Complicate 
The Discipline of Man – 
Compelling Him to Choose Himself 
His Preappointed Pain – (910) 
 
By most human standards, experience, the physical doing, going, and having, is preferred 
against the mental conceptualization of the same distance. Dickinson calls attention to the 
false dichotomy between mind and body—that any experience owned by the body could be 
somehow separate from the mediating perception of the mind. Experience is preferred 
against the mind, though paradoxically, the mind itself is responsible for all experience. In 
privileging the body over the mind, man only undermines the sublimity of his own faculties. 
Thoreau may have the vastness of fields to traverse, but even the unsettled wilderness of 
America is finite. Dickinson has the vastness of an infinite and inexhaustible mind for a 
playground and a muse. “The Outer – from the Inner” is a response to any who would 
question the validity of a life consciously explored from within rather than from without.  
The Outer – from the Inner 
Derives its Magnitude – 
‘Tis Duke, or Dwarf, according 
As is the central mood – 
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The fine – unvarying Axis 
That regulates the Wheel – 
Though Spokes – spin – more conspicuous  
And fling the dust – the while. 
 
The Inner – paints the Outer – 
The Brush without the Hand – 
Its Picture publishes – precise – 
As is the inner Brand – 
 
On fine – Arterial Canvases – 
A Cheek – perchance a Brow – 
The Star’s whole Secret – in the Lake – 
Eyes were not meant to know. (451) 
 
The magnitude and magnification that we experienced in “I think I was enchanted,” is the 
same magnitude that exists within the single word. Here, it is finally attributed to “the 
Inner.” Everything consumed from the external world that we understand in a particular, 
subjective way is colored by the mind. An object, or action, or condition may exist 
objectively, but we will never know it as such; the mind enlarges it and calls it a Duke, or 
diminishes it and calls it Dwarf. If there is any constant to be found, it is the endless 
presence of an ever-adjusting, ever-creating perceptive mind that acts as the central axis for 
the way we exist in the world. From this innermost point, the spokes spin, the body moves 
outward, and external motion becomes the conspicuous mode of experience, but all is 
directed from the center. “The Inner paints the outer,” adorning humble days not with a 
hand, but with the mind. Our minds are the reflection of the star in the lake. The image itself 
is perfect, the reflection of light comes from nowhere but the thing itself, and yet within the 
water, it appears differently. The reflection shimmers and ripples, and taken separately from 
what it represents, becomes something entirely new. In its newness it moves away from the 
original, and the secret of the original is lost. Only the shimmer, what Bachelard might call 
the orientation toward the secret, remains.  
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 However, in a post-Freudian culture, the inner perception of external events is more 
often associated with unconsciousness than consciousness. One of the extraordinary aspects 
of Dickinson’s exploration of internal immensity is the amount of agency she displays in the 
act of consciously traveling inward. The comparison of Emily Dickinson to Thoreau is 
fitting because if ever a poet chose to live—and write—deliberately, it was Dickinson. The 
images of Dickinson’s poetry are not supernatural forces washing over the-poet-as-medium. 
Her brain is her muse, and every verbal construction she makes contains all the agency of a 
footstep traversing solid land.  
The Brain – is wider than the Sky – 
For – put them side by side – 
The one the other will contain 
With ease – and You – beside – 
 
The Brain is deeper than the sea – 
For – hold them – Blue to Blue – 
The one the other will absorb – 
As Sponges – Buckets – do – 
 
The Brain is just the weight of God – 
For – Heft them – Pound for Pound – 
And they will differ – if they do – 
As Syllable from Sound – (632) 
 
This poem exemplifies the power-inversion that Dickinson had mastered. From a position 
that from the outside seems subservient—that of a spinster daughter, an unmarried woman 
confined in her familial home—she morphs into a dominant force, the master of the domain 
of her mind. People look outside to contemplate the vastness of the sky, without ever 
realizing that much vaster than the thing itself is the ability to perceive it. Perception, like a 
great bowl, holds the world in its entirety, though the bodies of those who perceive may 
seem inferior. In this poem, Dickinson extols the absolute sovereignty of individual 
perception. The extent to which she suggests that there is nothing outside of ourselves 
because everything is understood from within, even leads her to conclude that our minds are 
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as powerful as God, that they are nearly the same entities. If there is an aspect of Dickinson 
that seems empowering and exemplary it is this: we are not merely in the world, we each 
create the world.   
 And yet, the poems are like optical illusions, sometimes portraying the princess and 
other times revealing the witch. Each time Dickinson makes a bold statement, the statement 
unfolds itself within another poem. It is difficult to reconcile the Dickinson who believes in 
the sublimity of her mind with the Dickinson who writes a poem that begins, “I’m nobody!” 
How well we read Dickinson is a matter of how completely we are willing to accept the 
paradoxes of a poet who writes all moments, even those that contradict each other, with 
equal intensity. Perhaps it is due to the ephemeral nature of her truths that her work 
maintains its freshness. As her poems hinge so strongly on the provisional, nothing is left for 
history to “undo” that Dickinson has not undone herself.  
While Dickinson’s words, and her philosophy of words may seem appealing, they are 
by no means intended to be prescriptive. She offers no religion and no solution. Her poems 
are the problems themselves. She may restate the question, or reverse the mathematics, but 
answers were never of any final interest to Dickinson. Like the poet, the reader becomes 
accustomed to finding value in the discord. “I pondered how the bliss would look –/And 
would it feel as big –/When I could take it in my hand –/As hovering – seen – through fog” 
(271, 9-12). Just as she refuses to hold the object of desire in her hand for fear that once 
held, it becomes small and loses the magic she had invested it with before it became tangible, 
Dickinson offers us nothing to hold onto. What she offers in the stead of cold, round, 
marble-sized truths is possibility—and not the kind of possibility that resembles blithe 
optimism. Dickinson’s possibility looks more like hope: “a strange invention/ A Patent of 
the Heart – ” (1392, 1-2) that through “its unique momentum/ Embellish all we own – ” (7-
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8). This hope-like possibility is something chastened by an awareness of its own limitations 
that nevertheless strives always to expand the circumference of these limitations to 
encompass a space where something new can be created, and where something might be 
gained.  Dickinson gives us the dark and gives us desire. She turns rooms into worlds, 
pictures into things, words into images, minds into gods, and before we find ourselves 
comfortable, she has turned them back again just in time to preserve the wonder of the 
creative experience. By giving us nothing definitively, she lavishes us with everything 
provisionally.  
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 Chapter II 
Destructive Urges: Alcott, Stoddard, and the Novel as Play Space 
 
“It is easy to work when the soul is at play,” writes Dickinson. As examined briefly in 
the previous chapter, play provides a vehicle in which structural confinement, both physical 
and verbal, can be expanded to encompass imaginative depths. To play is to engage in 
games, to pretend, to delight in the imaginary, and to indulge the whimsical. The realm of 
play belongs to childhood, and yet, through the figure of someone like Dickinson we begin 
to understand play not only as a fanciful aspect of juvenile life, but as an action with 
consequence, an act of the imagination that is more than a dream—that almost undetectably 
bleeds into actual life and colors our perceptions. When considering the role of imagination 
in the alteration and expansion of spaces—particularly domestic space—the importance of 
play is central. This chapter intends to examine the space of play, both thematically and 
linguistically, as it appears in two mid-nineteenth century novels: the beloved classic, Little 
Women written by Louisa May Alcott, and the comparatively strange and obscure Morgesons 
by Elizabeth Stoddard. Both novels explore an intrinsic relationship between adolescence 
and the role of play in negotiating the intermediate space between childhood and 
womanhood. 
 In order to do this, however, it is of primary importance to distinguish the 
indistinguishable: to define what play consists of, and what happens to individuals when they 
engage in play. Play is indefinable because it is defined by the actuality that it is not. In D.W. 
Winnicott’s Playing and Reality, a treatise on play and the role it holds in individual and social 
life, he theorizes play—similar to girlhood—as a transitional space. Play comes from a need 
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established in the infantile state to distinguish and make compromises between the world of 
“me” and the world of “not-me.” Winnicott describes play as the space of interaction 
between the infant (representing the inner reality of the individual) and the mother 
(representing external reality, or the world that is outside the control the individual). 
Winnicott writes: 
The third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore, is 
an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life 
both contribute. It is an area that is not challenged, because no claim is made 
on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the individual 
engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality 
separate yet interrelated. (3)  
 
Play is the space in which the individual learns how to mediate a subjective world in which 
the individual controls all the elements perceptively, and an objective world, a pre-
established system with pre-established conditions entirely outside of individual control. 
Playing becomes a kind of compromise, in which the individual learns to see herself in 
relation with the world outside her control and with other individuals, and at the same time 
is able to manipulate elements of that world in a third space that is neither entirely internal 
nor entirely external. “In playing, the child manipulates external phenomena in the service of 
the dream and invests chosen external phenomena with dream meaning and feeling” (69). A 
certain mixing occurs in this third space. Through play, the child can symbolically control 
and master what is external (and troubling for this reason), while at the same time accepting 
those conditions which are uncontrollable, simultaneously investing them with meaning that 
comes from the interior.  
 The exchange that occurs in the play space is of primary importance to human 
experience precisely because it is a creative exchange. “It is in playing and only in playing that 
the individual child or adult is able to be creative and to use the whole personality, and it is 
only in being creative that the individual discovers the self” (73). Winnicott suggests that the 
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healthy human being is one with a proportionate sense of balance between the external and 
the internal, and that this balance is fundamentally linked to the individual’s capacity to 
practice creative agency.  
It is creative apperception more than anything else that makes the individual 
feel that life is worth living. Contrasted with this is a relationship to external 
reality which is one of compliance, the world and its details being recognized 
but only as something to be fitted in with or demanding adaptation. 
Compliance carries with it a sense of futility for the individual and is 
associated with the idea that nothing matters and that life is not worth living. 
(Winnicott 87) 
 
Dickinson’s work shares a similar relationship to the aspects of creativity and confinement 
associated with structure. A structure is an external system located outside the psychic 
control of the individual, yet because Dickinson is able to imbue her structures with created 
perceptive meaning—she turns words into images—the structures, instead of forcing her 
into a position of compliance, serve as a tool to access creative experience. In addition, just 
as Dickinson’s relationship to words and structure is a paradox of creation and 
destruction—words both do and undo, Winnicott presents play as a similar paradox of space 
that is neither entirely internal nor entirely external. 
I make my idea of play concrete by claiming that playing has a place and a time. 
It is not inside by any use of the word […], Nor is it outside, that is to say, it is 
not a part of the repudiated world, the not-me, that which the individual has 
decided to recognize (with whatever difficulty and even pain) as truly 
external, which is outside magical control. To control what is outside one has 
to do things, not simply to think or to wish, and doing things takes time. Playing 
is doing. (55) 
 
The space of play and the capacity of language suddenly become concerned with the same 
question. Can the embodiment of the imaginative, creative act cross from the world of the 
fantasy into the world of things that are real? According to Winnicott, as far as this question 
is relevant to play it is also relevant to the self, and the formation of identity. The formation 
of “feminine” identity is an especially present theme in both Little Women and The Morgesons. 
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Both novels adequately meet the qualifications for consideration as examples of nineteenth 
century Bildungsromane—though ample criticism illuminates the way in which Stoddard’s 
novel resists this categorization3—yet, at a most basic level, the novels center around the 
lives of sisters and daughters as they transition from childhood into adulthood.  
 As play itself is something of a threshold space, it becomes important to consider the 
liminality of female adolescence as a space between childhood and womanhood. Especially 
in the 19th century Bildungsroman, the developmental model prevailed as a means of 
“charting” individual growth; in theory, the journey from childhood to adulthood was 
regulated and precisely delineated. Girlhood transitioned into adolescence, which in turn 
transitioned into womanhood, all stages both clearly demarcated and final upon completion. 
Emily Dickinson’s cutting poem, “She rose to his requirements” reflects this mindset of a 
life segmented into detachable parts.  
 
She rose to His Requirement – dropt 
The Playthings of Her Life 
To take the honorable Work  
Of Woman, and of Wife – 
 
If ought She missed in Her new Day, 
Of Amplitude, or Awe – 
Or first Prospective – Or the Gold 
In using, wear away, 
 
It lay unmentioned – as the Sea 
Develop Pearl, and Weed, 
But only to Himself – be known  
The Fathoms they abide – (732) 
 
Wifehood severs a woman from the “playthings” of her girlhood with the suddenness and 
finality of a guillotine: this from a woman who made a literary lifetime experiment of 
remaining a girl in her father’s house. And yet for a woman who seems to have remained 
                                            
3 See Alaimo, Stacy. “Elizabeth Stoddard’s The Morgesons: A Feminist Dialogue of Bildung and Descent.” 
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chastely tucked away from the realities of “adult” life, Dickinson’s choice to stay in the realm 
of girlhood—a stage understood to be only temporary—takes on an aspect of the perverse. 
For girlhood, especially as it progresses through adolescence, has qualities about it that are 
uncomfortable in their indefiniteness. Though this intermediate stage has potential for rich 
experiential development, the “mystery” of the pre-woman state seems to be tolerated 
without question in this developmental model on the basis of its temporariness—soon what 
is temperamental and indefinable will pass into a stable and defined womanhood. By 
adamantly refusing to leave a realm of girlhood that might seem to no longer fit, and with 
equal willfulness refusing to enter a state of conventional womanhood, Dickinson breaks the 
rule of temporariness that makes the inscrutability of female adolescence acceptable. There is 
something both strange and unacceptable about someone who refuses to “progress.”  
 In Gillian’s Brown’s essay “Child’s Play” she explores the narratives of progress 
inherent in play by presenting a historical overview of gendered play and childhood in the 
nineteenth century. Using popular literature to compare such characters as Tom Sawyer and 
Huckleberry Finn to the March sisters in Little Women, Brown illustrates the vast difference 
between the means and purposes of “boys’ play” and “girls’ play.” Brown argues that both 
boys’ play and girls’ play “serve a narrative of progress” (92), yet boys’ play, full of mischief, 
aggression, and savagery, starts from a primal past and emerges into a civil present as boys 
become men, where girls’ play is always future tending—anticipating and practicing in the 
present moment for the womanhood, and more specifically the wifehood, which is to come.  
Brown uses Louisa May Alcott’s Little Women extensively to support her argument 
that “as girls play their versions of adult female roles, acting as little women, they prefigure 
the continuation of those roles” (91). Brown contrasts this play of future consequences to 
the play of boys, who “emerge miraculously unscathed from their activities. The primary 
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feature of the ‘mischeif, frolic, and general deucedness’ of boys is that it is just fun—it has 
no consequences” (89). Though this contrast is used to distinguish between the past-tending 
narrative of boys’ play and the future-tending narrative of girls’, it runs the risk of making an 
over-simplified claim about the quality of these two different kinds of play. Brown clearly 
illuminates that girls’ play is oriented toward an established system of domestic order, while 
boys’ play is off the societal grid, but this does not necessitate that boys’ play ought to be 
privileged as more imaginative than girls’ play—and this point, though not expressly 
articulated by Brown, is illustrated vividly by Brown’s main literary focus for girls’ play—
Little Women.  
Little Women is a difficult text to use to illustrate any point concretely, especially the 
role of play. It’s a chameleon in its politics, its attitude toward patriarchy, and in its treatment 
of gender. The novel’s continuous popularity can be attributed in part to its singular 
determination to fall neither here nor there. Volleyed back and forth, praised and scorned 
alternately as progressively feminist or stiflingly conservative, Little Women has not ceased to 
be relevant or controversial in its portrayal of womanhood. Ann B. Murphy asks the 
question directly: 
Is Little Women adolescent, sentimental, repressive, an instrument for teaching 
girls how to become ‘little,’ domesticated, and silent? Is the novel, subversive, 
matriarchal, and implicitly revolutionary, fostering discontent with the very 
model of female domesticity it purports to admire? (Murphy 564) 
  
These conflicting questions are deeply tied to the portraits of the four “little” women as they 
cross the threshold into womanhood. A close examination of the complex and nuanced 
function of play during this time of development helps to make sense of these polarized 
opinions of the novel.  
Winnicott’s theory of play as an intermediate space between total individual control 
and an uncontrollable external system is especially applicable to Little Women. Within the 
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novel, the four March sisters are constantly in a state of modifying their behavior to sync 
with the values of dominant systems: Christianity, familial structures, American patriotism, 
and womanly social standards. The importance of “work” and “duty” is presented as a 
means to improve “faults”—often associated with individualist tendencies that pose threats 
to these communitarian systems, such as vanity, shyness, and rampant independence. When 
their Father, who has dutifully signed up for military service to fight for the Union Army, 
writes home: 
‘A year seems a very long time to wait before I see them, but remind them 
that while we wait, we may all work, so that these hard days need not be 
wasted. I know they will remember all I said to them, that they will be loving 
children to you, will do their duty faithfully, fight their bosom enemies 
bravely, and conquer themselves so beautifully that when I come back to 
them I may be fonder and prouder than ever of my little women.’ (17) 
 
In the opening pages of the novel we see the battle against the self begin, as the girls decide 
to give up their Christmas presents to acknowledge those who are less fortunate than 
themselves. “We ought not to spend money for pleasure, when our men are suffering so in 
the army,” (7) says Meg, who, as the oldest and closest to womanhood, must begin to 
exercise womanly attributes with expediency. Interestingly, the relinquished gifts that the 
other three sisters would have chosen for themselves are all related to creative endeavors. Jo 
March the self-styled author would have bought a novel, sensitive Beth March would have 
bought sheet-music, and Amy March the artist would have bought a new box of drawing 
pencils. This one preliminary scene establishes a tension between personal creativity and 
duty that expands and contracts through the entirety of the novel.  Though the girls 
constantly reckon with their “bosom enemies,” and Marmee is frequently portrayed as giving 
advice such as “Watch and pray, dear; never get tired of trying; and never think it impossible 
to conquer your fault” (89), the moments when duty entirely trumps creativity and personal 
desire are few and far between. In Alcott’s novel, duty to a system and the creativity of the 
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individual are joined in a relationship that causes each to inform the other. Gillian Brown 
describes the way girls’ play becomes subjugated to fit a system of domesticity through 
“dolls and other domestic objects such as sewing kits and stoves […] in order that girls from 
an early age might become absorbed with housekeeping” (91), but what makes Little Women a 
fascinating study of play is that quite often the opposite occurs: creativity colors and infuses 
a previously un-malleable system.  
In The Poetics of Space, Gaston Bachelard writes: 
But how can housework be made into a creative activity? The minute we 
apply a glimmer of consciousness to a mechanical gesture, or practice 
phenomenology while polishing a piece of old furniture, we sense new 
impressions come into being beneath this familiar domestic duty. For 
consciousness rejuvenates everything, giving a quality of beginning to the 
most everyday actions. It even dominates memory. How wonderful it is to 
really become once more the inventor of a mechanical action! (67) 
 
Bachelard refers in a different way to the same phenomena of agency that Winnicott 
delineates as central to play, by reinventing the task—reinvigorating the external world 
through conscious endowment of meaning—the task transitions from a prescribed activity 
to a creative one. The girls in Little Women spend the first half of the novel engaging in 
games, imaginative play, role-playing, and experiments that while domestically oriented, 
succeed in showcasing the way domesticity is creatively reappropriated and the quotidian is 
transcended, even in quite simple instances. 
It was uninteresting sewing, but to-night no one grumbled. They adopted 
Jo’s plan of dividing the long seams into four parts, and calling the quarters 
Europe, Asia, Africa and America, and in that way got on capitally, especially 
when they talked about the different countries as they stitched their way 
through them. (18) 
 
 By simply imagining the sheet in a grander context, both the sheet itself and the capacity for 
the task to be more than menial are expanded, not only in importance and interest—but also 
in a way that verges on spatial. Bachelard writes, “[By] changing space, by leaving the space 
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of one’s usual sensibilities, one enters into communication with a space that is psychically 
innovating” (206).  
 Other games have an extended focus throughout the novel. “Playing Pilgrim,” the 
imaginative dramatic reenactment of Paul Bunyan’s Christian allegorical novel Pilgrim’s 
Progress, is a constant and recurring imaginative exercise that the girls fall in and out of. 
Encouraged by their mother to think of their own strife as the “burden” that Pilgrim carries, 
the girls begin to align the landmarks in their own lives with those in Pilgrims Progress. 
Marmee says: 
“We are never too old for this, my dear, because it is a play we are playing all 
the time in one way or another. Our burdens are here, our road is before us, 
and the longing for goodness and happiness is the guide that leads us 
through many troubles and mistakes to the peace which is a true Celestial 
City. Now, my little pilgrims, suppose you begin again, not in play, but in 
earnest, and see how far on you can get before father comes home.” (18) 
 
Games like “playing Pilgrim” introduce and privilege a value system that the external world 
would have the individual adopt. By approaching these values in a space of play, the lessons 
are not oppressively foisted upon the girls, but rather discovered by them, and authentically 
chosen. For a girl like the energetic and tom-boyish Jo, who “[hates] to think I’ve got to 
grow up grow up and be Miss March, and wear long gowns, and look as prim as a China-
aster” (9), real and active experience is the only way she can willingly adopt a domestic value 
system that often runs contrary to her boyish inclinations.  “‘It’s bad enough to be a girl, 
any-way, when I like boys’ games, and work, and manners. I can’t get over my 
disappointment at not being a boy, and it’s worse than ever now, for I’m dying to go and 
fight with papa, and I can only stay at home and knit like a poky old woman’” (9). For this 
reason, Jo requires the kind of imaginative play that completely engages her faculties. Dolls 
and kitchen sets hardly provide a fraction of the freedom that less constrained forms of play 
do. Another similar example can be found in the girls’ “Busy-Bee Society.”  
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Well, we have tried not to waste our holiday, but each has had a task, and 
worked at it with a will. The vacation is nearly over, the stints are all done, 
and we are ever so glad that we didn’t dawdle. […] Mother likes to have us 
out of doors as much as possible; so we bring our work here, and have nice 
times. For the fun of it we bring things in these bags, wear the old hats, use 
poles to climb the hill, and play pilgrims, as we used to do years ago. We call 
this hill the ‘Delectable Mountain,’ for we can look far away and see the 
country where we hope to live some time. (152) 
 
Under the tree where the society convenes, the girls impart mystical importance to the 
tedium of everyday chores that would otherwise have to be performed unembellished. 
Adventure, excitement, and consequence seep into the commonplace and the ordinary takes 
on a quality of sacredness. These tasks are no longer outside the girls, but become linked to a 
greater sense of self. Nor does the play always positively embody the value of the external 
system. When Marmee allows the girls to try their “idleness experiment” in which the girls—
tired of working—decide to do no work for a week, the play required by the experiment is 
precisely the opposite of the beneficial lesson. After a week of sloth, carelessness, boredom, 
petty bickering, and disorderliness, the girls adopt Marmee’s advice to “Have regular hours 
for work and play; make each day both useful and pleasant, and prove that you understand 
the worth of time by employing it well” (129), however, this didactic grain was not 
embedded into the play—the girls had to actively reject their experiment of idleness in order 
to find the value of work.  
 Other forms of play as well—such as the attic theater and the household circulated 
Pickwick Paper also join the imaginative with tasks and skills that would otherwise seem 
proscribed for girls learning to be women. Here is Alcott’s description of the slip-shod yet 
magical theater. 
Being still too young to go often to the theatre, and not rich enough to 
afford any great outlay for private performances, the girls put their wits to 
work, and necessity being the mother of invention, made whatever they 
needed. Very clever were some of their productions; paste-board guitars, 
antique lamps made of old-fashioned butter-boats, covered with silver paper, 
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gorgeous robes of old cotton, glittering with tin spangles from a pickle 
factory, and armor covered with the same useful diamond-shaped bits, left in 
sheets when the lids of tin preserve-pots were cut out. The furniture was 
used to being topsy-turvy, and the big chamber was the scene of many 
innocent revels. (24) 
 
This imaginative, creative passage where pickle-tins and old cotton transform into the richest 
material, is immediately joined to a justifying description of what makes the theatrical 
experience edifying. “It was an excellent drill for their memories, a harmless amusement, and 
employed many hours which otherwise would have been idle, lonely, or spent in less 
profitable society” (25). The contrast between these two passages, the one with a certain 
intimate insularity and the other calling upon externally mandated skills and standards, 
illustrates the complexity of the play space as Winnicott has recognized it.  
 By the end of the novel, all of the girls (with the exception of Beth, whose death of 
scarlet fever seems to be required as a final condition of curbing Jo’s willfulness) have 
“overcome” themselves, embracing the individuality of their natures only as they can 
contribute to the version of womanhood they have aspired to since girlhood. Meg gives up 
ideas of finery to embrace the virtues of being “a poor man’s wife,” Amy uses her artistic 
talent—prudently realizing that she is not gifted with genius—to create the illusion of finery 
with limited means, and Jo takes her love of books and her love for boyish antics and opens 
a school. All of them get married—and all are presented as being happy and satisfied with 
the choices they have made. With regard to Winnicott, Little Women seems to serve as an 
example of play space functioning in the most ideal manner. The girls learn to mediate 
between their own individual realities and the reality of the external world that they need to 
function within. Their games bring them into positions of agency that carry into 
womanhood, while teaching them the “realities” that accompany this position. And yet, 
though this model of play would seem to be empowering, certainly more so than dolls and 
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kitchen sets, the final utterly content note of the novel rings with a hollowness that is not 
easy to pinpoint. What is it about Little Women that “remains something of a tarbaby, a sticky, 
sentimental, entrapping experience?” (Murphy 564).  
This question goes beyond the reasonably progressive content of the novel and 
invites us to take a closer look at the form. The form of Little Women is not usually on the 
forefront of discussion on matters relating to the novel, it often seems to slip by unnoticed. 
While the implications of the content are debated fiercely, critics seem less inclined to 
consider the writing itself with equal importance: an unfortunate oversight as it is the tone 
and structure of the novel that contains the key to its undoing.  Ann Murphy writes that 
“Alcott attempts to move beyond such futile polarities by depicting a dream of reconciliation 
between autonomy and community” (575)—a similar description to Winnicott’s definition 
of play. Alcott, attempting to portray an engaging and challenging portrait of womanhood 
while working under intense cultural constraints, has created “a dream” of compromised 
womanhood, partially conservative and partially radical, that is constructed through language 
in the form of a novel that is uncannily even-handed. The womanhood Alcott portrays is a 
womanhood that does not exist, and I would suggest that part of the evasive dissatisfaction 
with a novel that does represent so many instances of female empowerment, is the lurking 
suspicion on the part of the reader that she is watching scenes from a play, and not scenes 
from real life. Despite being incredibly engaging, the depiction is not entirely convincing.  
 The suspicion of theatrically performed womanhood is confirmed during one of the 
most interesting scenes in the novel in which the even-handedness falters, and a brief 
moment of “real conditions” is made visible to the reader. This is the scene when Jo 
confesses her struggle with anger to her mother. “You don’t know; you can’t guess how bad 
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it is! […] I get so savage, I could hurt any one, and enjoy it. Oh, mother! Help me, do help 
me!” Jo beseeches. Marmee replies: 
You think your temper is the worst in the world; but mine used to be just like 
it. […] I’ve been trying to cure it for forty years, and have only succeeded in 
controlling it. I am angry nearly every day of my life, Jo; but I have learned 
not to show it; and I still hope to learn not to feel it, though it may take me 
another forty years to do so. […] Your father [helped me], Jo. He helped and 
comforted me, and showed me that I must try to practise all the virtues I 
would have my little girls possess, for I was their example. […] The love, 
respect and confidence of my children was the sweetest reward I could 
receive for my efforts to be the woman I would have them copy. (89-90)  
 
The strong, intelligent, empowered Mother figure who has thus far driven the developmental 
progress of the girls has just admitted to being other than she seems. Not only does her 
heart stray from the image of “true womanhood” that she embodies, but must, on a daily 
basis act contrary to her true inclinations and emotions. With this disturbing flash of insight 
we realize that “discovering the real self of the woman playing the little woman is an 
impossible task, in part because the essence of the role is that it appears to be the ‘real’ self” 
(Murphy 573).  
 This “dream” of womanhood becomes more pronounced when we examine certain 
suggestive metafictional devices that Alcott employs in her seemingly straightforward novel. 
In the chapter entitled “Burdens”, Marmee sits the girls down to tell a bedtime story. Jo 
requests, “‘another story, mother, one with a moral to it. I like to think about them 
afterwards, if they are real, and not too preachy.’” And then Mrs. March proceeds to tell the 
girls the story of themselves, arguably the basic plot arch of the novel, having “told stories to 
this little audience for many years, [she] knew how to please them” (52). The story begins by 
introducing four girls with different flaws who learn to become happy, good, and fulfilled 
women by overcoming their respective burdens. Fascinatingly, the bedtime story works on 
precisely the same principles that make the novel successful.  
 49 
 It presents a version of successfully “achieved” womanhood that has not yet come to 
pass. The future tending perspective of girls who aspire to reach a certain goal is a clever way 
of obscuring the possibility that not only does this goal not exist beyond the theatrical—but 
it may be impossible for it to exist otherwise. It creates a model, an arguably attractive one, 
without ensuring that this model has a real place in a society that is not tailored to consider 
the non-theatrical happiness and satisfaction of women. There is an entire chapter dedicated 
to the girls discussing their Bunyan-esque “Castles in the Air”—“selfish” dreams they have 
for the future of wealth, fame, and beauty. What the reader perhaps uncomfortably senses, is 
that the “real” future they aspire to is an equally unlikely fantasy. This accounts for that 
tempering note of hollowness when, by the end of the novel, everything has seemed to work 
out. The reader is torn between the pleasure of sunny closure and the negation of reality 
brought on by the weirdly unchallenged success of the resolution.  
 The question of pleasure produces the final dilemma. Little Women, though 
progressive in content, ultimately works on a pleasure principle that belongs to the 
sentimental. Just as Marmee tells a story that she knows will “please” her audience, Alcott is 
writing a piece of popular fiction for girls, intended to please her audience and the variety of 
political leanings they might have. Alcott wrote a novel—and a version of womanhood—
that has something for the transcendentalist, traditionalist, and moralist alike. She wrote a 
deeply nuanced and hybrid version of 19th century American womanhood that has 
remarkably sustained criticism and entered the 21st century, all despite having never existed 
in the first place. Gillian Brown argues that, “ostensibly celebrating and promoting sentiment 
and sympathy for the sufferings of children, women and slaves, nineteenth century American 
popular fiction actually ‘provided the inevitable rationalization of the economic order’ in 
which slavery, female subordination, and child labor operated’” (78). When we are content 
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with Alcott’s “dream” of womanhood, and the happy ending it ensures for her characters, 
we passively accept the imaginary model, and neglect that it is not a real representation of 
life. For a novel that does in many ways seem to engage with political questions of women’s 
status, it does not offer a real solution for a real problem. In this way, the canonical and 
deceptively simple Little Women leaves us with more questions than answers. Can fiction ever 
be more than a stage? Can fictional characters ever present non-fictional answers to non-
fictional problems? Does play ever amount to more than fiction? Can the concept of play 
truly contribute to the reclamation of status and space in the way that Dickinson asserted 
that it could? Contrary to their polarized literary reputations, what questions the didactic 
Little Women only deepens, the strange and tumultuous Morgesons by Elizabeth Stoddard will 
help us answer.  
The Morgesons, Stoddard’s 1862 novel, defies any attempt at categorization. Stoddard 
scholar Sandra A. Zagarell writes, “we have tried to shoehorn the novel into categories 
which we habitually apply to American fiction of the era”: domestic, or ‘woman’s,’ fiction, 
various kinds of gothic, the ‘literature of misery,’ the Bildungsroman” yet The Morgesons refuses 
any one label, and is often considered to be some of the first “modernist” prose of its era, 
due to the complexity of the artistry. “Understatement, ellipses, and other formal elements 
which command readers’ attention—extended diaogues without exposition; offbeat pacing 
and rhythm; unexpected shifts in tone and focus” (Zagarell 286) are just a few of the 
elements that make The Morgesons stylistically challenging. Just as importantly, verbal 
conventions are not the only standards that Stoddard dismisses. Working hand-in-hand with 
her unusual language-use, Stoddard calls into question the reality of and permanence of 
social standards and cultural institutions such as the family and religion.   
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 The novel opens: “That child,’ said my aunt Mercy, looking at me with indigo-
colored eyes, ‘is possessed’” (5). From this simple four-word sentence broken by non-
dialogic recounting, personal perspective, and sensory detail, it becomes clear that not only 
will Stoddard deny the reader a cohesive experience of storytelling, but that language is also 
going to play both a formative and interrupting role in this process. If reading Alcott gives 
the reader a pleasure that stems from a narrative that “demarcates, encloses, establishes 
limits, [and] orders” (Brooks 5), any pleasure derived from Stoddard comes not from the 
organizing solidifying principles of plot, but from the tantalizing malleability and aleatory 
nature of language. Roland Barthes in The Pleasure of the Text writes: 
 The brio of the text (without which, after all, there is no text) is its will to bliss: 
Just where it exceeds demand, transcends prattle, and whereby it attempts to 
overflow, to break through the constraint of adjectives—which are those 
doors of language through which the ideological and imaginary come flowing 
in. (Barthes 13)  
 
Stoddard’s language is wildly unbound by the constraints of conventional narration. 
Conversely, bound like a stage and working within the limits imposed by the theatrical 
elements, Little Women creates a system that feels safely fenced by both the reader’s and the 
author’s expectation of meaning. Peter Brooks suggests of plot: 
What animates us as readers of narrative is la passion du sens, which I would 
want to translate as both the passion for meaning and the passion of meaning: 
the active quest of the reader for those shaping ends that, terminating the 
dynamic process of reading, promise to bestow meaning and significance on 
the beginning and the middle. (19) 
 
Brooks speaks of the desire for the novel to contain a message, logically revealed and 
contained. The emphasis on plot—what occurs between the beginning and the end, is 
analogous to the way we conceive of adolescence. We want to see girls grow from children 
into women, and for that change to follow a linear (and in Alcott’s case) positive slope of 
development that is as clear as possible. These are not the standards to which we can hold 
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Stoddard. Jessica Feldman, author of “A Talent for the Disagreeable: Elizabeth Stoddard 
Writes The Morgesons,” writes: 
Reading the novel as if it presented a transparent window through which we 
see the illusion of actual people going about their lives will take us only so far 
in understanding and appreciating it. [Stoddard’s] novel also announces its 
quality of being an autonomous addition to the world rather than being 
merely a representation of the world. In her drive for power, Stoddard, like 
Gustave Flaubert, another creative contemporary, imagines a novel in which 
the godlike artist creates a world with its own rules and style, its own 
rhetoric. (220) 
 
Unlike the knit-boundedness of Little Women in which words, actions, and character 
development share an interlinked relation to one another, the Morgesons seems to operate 
both verbally and thematically on a rhetoric of adjacency, where words find themselves in 
suggestive proximity to other words without precluding significance. Language itself can be 
viewed in the same way in which Cassandra, the main character, views the Morgeson family. 
When Mary Morgeson’s death puts Cassandra in a position of needing to create the Alcott-
esque illusion of familial unity, Cassandra realizes just how artificial it is. 
The unthought-of result of mother’s death—disorganization, began to show 
itself. The individuality which had kept the weakness and faults of our family 
life in abeyance must have been powerful; and I had never recognized it! I 
attempted to analyze this influence, so strong, yet so invisibly produced. […] 
Would endowment of character explain it—that faculty which we could not 
change, give, or take? Character was a mysterious and indestructible fact, and 
a fact that I had little respect for. Upon what a false basis I had gone—a 
basis of extremes. I had seen men as trees walking; that was my experience. 
(216) 
 
Though Cassandra’s mother, described as mild, dreamy, and indifferent is anything but the 
assertive and energetic mother from Little Women, she does seem to have the same power to 
create the theatrical illusion of unity. When the mother, the binding narrative of the family 
so to speak, disappears—the significance of being a Morgeson also disappears. Family 
members are simply born into and continue to live in proximity, with no greater meaning 
than that which binds a grove of trees. The resemblance that family members do or do not 
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share suggest things of one another, but nothing that ultimately proposes truths. “I 
pondered over what father had said; he had perceived something in me which I was not 
aware of. I resolved to think seriously over it; in the morning I found I had not thought of it 
at all” (54). It is suggested that Locke Morgeson has picked up on some key of greater 
import to Cassandra’s character, but no definitive importance is ever granted this unspoken 
perception. Likewise, Cassandra seems to constantly ask herself of her relatives, “What had 
they in common with me?” (31). Relations may hint connection, but do not cause nor stem 
from it.  
 The opacity of Stoddard’s language leans on the same principles. Stoddard’s dialogue 
seems especially to be more suggestive of association than causation. In a conversation 
between Alice and Cassandra, Alice says: 
“Do I hurt you Cass?” 
“No, do I ever hurt you, Alice?” And I divided the long bands over my eyes, 
and looked up at her. 
“Were any of your family ever cracked? I have long suspected you of a 
disposition that way.” 
“The child is choking itself with that handkerchief.” (100) 
 
The scene takes place while Alice, the wife of Charles Locke, with whom Cassandra shares 
an unconsummated romantic and erotic tension, combs Cassandra’s hair in the presence of 
Alice’s infant son. The dialogue evokes instinctual feelings of apprehension between the 
women, but it is difficult to say precisely why. Stoddard uses language in a painterly way, 
allowing for words such as “hurt”, “divided”, “over my eyes”, “cracked”, and “choking” to 
color and inform meanings of each other without ever enforcing one interpretation. The 
words seem to drift into relationships, no one combination sustaining a bond any stronger 
than any other, and hardly a page goes by without encountering one of these semi-lucid, 
semi-opaque passages.  
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 Though one might suggest that this indeterminable nexus limits the capacity for 
meaning and thereby the satisfaction of the reader, Little Women helps illustrate how 
Stoddard’s ambiguity actually produces a multiplicity of meanings, which is both more 
complex and finally more satisfying than the subjugation of literary elements to “the 
message.” The insistence of Little Women on the version of womanhood that it illustrates is 
theatrical in and of itself. The author-chosen meaning for a reader to take away from a 
selection of depicted events posed as naturally-occurring, substantiates the presence of a 
unified vision of the lives of individuals that can only be a construction. The March women’s 
intimate and complete understanding of one another both interpersonally and in the context 
of what the novel proposes about womanhood can only exist as a theatrical situation under 
an authorial pen. Little Women is so tidy in its construction that by the end of the novel, the 
device is fairly transparent. Because Stoddard never insists on the boundaries of The 
Morgesons, the absence of a unifying logic for the characters to work within illustrates an 
imperfect sympathy that resembles real relationships and interactions. When Stoddard leaves 
it to the reader to “order” the fragments that compose a life, the reader responds to 
Stoddard in the way that actual, non-fictional, existence requires.  
 One way of thinking about the complexity of literary space that The Morgesons 
occupies is to think of it in terms of regions. In a chapter from The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life entitled “Regions and Region Behavior,” Erving Goffman uses a theatrical 
metaphor to describe the roles of “front regions” and “back regions” as they relate to the 
organization and demonstration of the self to others. Front regions “refer to the place where 
the performance is given” (107) and pertain to manners, standards, and the way we present 
ourselves to “an audience.” Back regions function as the backstage, where the illusion of the 
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reality of the performance is prepared. Goffman’s description of the performance is an 
especially apt way of viewing the theatricality of Little Women. 
When a performance is given it is usually given in a highly bounded region 
[…]. The impression and understanding fostered by the performance will 
tend to saturate the region and time span, so that any individual located in 
this space-time manifold will be in a position to observe the performance and 
be guided by the definition of the situation which the performance fosters. 
(106) 
 
Using this metaphor, Little Women takes place almost entirely in a front region—with the 
exception of brief moments such as Marmee’s confession to Jo. Even portrayals of instances 
that might seem to belong to the back-regions—like when Jo confesses at any point 
throughout the novel her dissatisfaction with the model of womanhood she’s supposed to 
adopt—actually suggest more of a stage within a stage, where the back regions we think 
we’re seeing are still contrived and occurring in the front. Here Goffman describes the back 
regions to which Alcott refuses the reader access: 
A back region or backstage may be defined as a place relative to the given 
performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is 
knowingly contradicted as a matter of course. […] It is here that the capacity 
of a performance to express something beyond itself may be painstakingly 
fabricated; it is here that illusions and impressions are openly constructed. 
[…] Here the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his 
lines, and step out of character. (112) 
 
While Little Women operates with a clear intuitive understanding of the duality of 
front and back regions, the “performance” of The Morgesons seems particularly “unguided” 
because not only does Stoddard seem ill-content to portray only the front regions, she 
refuses to allow for the partitioning of regions at all. Stoddard, through Cassandra’s 
narration, is unwilling to differentiate between the moments of “back” and “front.” This 
lends the novel the disorienting double-effect of seeming simultaneously impenetrable and 
psychologically revealing. The back regions of the novel are not contained to Cassandra’s 
own personal back regions; it’s as if she has none. The realities of the back region drift 
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through the front regions of the novel undistinguished from the performative conventions 
that we would expect to find there. Though the moments of internal reflection where 
Cassandra might synthesize her experience for the reader are few, the inappropriate, tense 
non-sequiturs that pervade the dialogue and descriptions show us more of the internal life of 
the characters than access to their thoughts ever could. Take for example what should be a 
simple evening greeting between the Morgeson parents: 
“Did you have a cold ride, Locke?” asked mother, gazing into the fire with 
that expression of satisfaction we have when somebody beside ourselves has 
been exposed to hardships. It is the same principle entertained by those who 
depend upon and enjoy seeing criminals hung. (156)  
 
The connection between the banal and the morbid is not Mary’s own, it is Cassandra’s 
observation and extrapolation, unverifiable yet uncanny in its insight. However, even these 
revealing moments are unexplained. Stoddard leaves it to the reader to connect what it could 
“mean” that Mary’s comment is connected to the image of a hanging in Cassandra’s mind.  
Stoddard’s use of the third space of the novel as a region that refuses to be divided 
between public performance and private rehearsal easily aligns itself with Winnicott’s 
description of the third space of play. As mentioned earlier, Winnicott defines this space as 
an intermediate area that is both internal and external, and keeps these realities connected yet 
differentiated (3). Winnicott writes: 
It is assumed that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no 
human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and 
that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience, 
which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.). This intermediate area is in direct 
continuity with the play area of the child who is ‘lost’ in play. (18) 
 
Where Alcott, through content, depicts young girls reconciling their individuality with their 
society through play, Stoddard is actively engaging in an adult version of the play-act, which 
Winnicott suggests is not something relegated to childhood, but is necessary throughout the 
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life-span. The Morgesons represents a third space where the primacy of the play space is not 
play’s depiction in the content, but the language that composes the novel itself.   
 Though both novels are using play spaces to mediate issues of agency, conformity, 
confinement and expansion, the differences between Alcott’s depiction of play and 
Stoddard’s use of verbal play could not be more significant. If we consider again Gillian 
Brown’s historical differentiation between the purposes and characteristics of boys’ play and 
girls’ play, we will find that the language of The Morgesons radically unhinges the binary, as it 
more closely embodies the distinguishing features of boys’ play “noted for its heedlessness 
and vitality, as a state of savagery” (Brown 90). Take for example another unsettling scene of 
dialogue that takes place between Cassandra and her sister, Veronica.  
“See,” she said softly. “I have something from heaven.” She lifted her white 
apron, and I saw under it, pinned to her dress, a splendid black butterfly, 
spotted with red and gold. 
       “It is mine,” she said, “you shall not touch it. God blew it in through the 
window; but it has not breathed yet.” 
        “Pooh; I have three mice in the kitchen.” 
        “Where is their mother?” 
        “In the hayrick, I suppose, I left it there.” 
        “I hate you,” she said, in an enraged voice. “I would strike you if it 
wasn’t for this holy butterfly.” (20) 
 
At the end of the scene, Cassandra takes the butterfly and crushes it in the presence of 
Veronica. Jessica Feldman comments of the “savage civility” of scenes such as these. She 
writes: 
This is a world where everyone is in deep conflict. […] In fact, the harshness 
of the novel as a whole appears mysteriously de trop, whether it appears in the 
brutality of Cassandra’s playmates, the violence of the family life in the 
Morgeson household, or the bitter cold that Veronica chooses to experience 
through the lattice of her wintry bedroom. (205) 
 
But it is not simply the actions of the characters that are abrupt, un-empathetic, and even 
violent: the language and the construction of the novel exhibit these tendencies. Whereas 
Alcott’s unifying narration would fill in the gap that occurs between Veronica’s 
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inquisitiveness and her rage, the stacking of Stoddard’s unmediated dialogue has the affect of 
slamming the incongruous together as an experimentation for effect. It often results in 
jarring, unintuitive verbal combinations. Finessing descriptions the reader would ordinarily 
seek—the narration of a change in facial expression, the reliance on a prior sense of a 
character’s volatility—are missing. In order to continue reading, the reader must reassess 
how a scene—from its logical comprehension to its aesthetic—is being processed. Roland 
Barthes writes, “The text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts […], unsettles 
the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, 
values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language” (Barthes 14). The crisis that 
requires this revaluation is invigorating, not merely within the logic of the novel, but in a way 
that transcends the page. Where the March sisters, locked within the narrative of Little 
Women, bring new consciousness to their play-turned-reality, it is the reader outside of The 
Morgesons who brings new consciousness to Stoddard’s verbal play.  
 Though all writing can be said to operate as a third, play space, and Alcott’s novel, 
through written from within a lulling dream of narrative unity compared to Stoddard’s wild 
disjunction, is no exception—there is something about Stoddard’s verbal play space that 
seems ultimately more empowering as a means for enlarging personal agency.  This 
difference is fundamentally linked to the difference between the kind of writing that suggests 
that one should read as a spectator and the kind that invites and requires reading as a creator. 
Ironically, though the sisters of Little Women find agency and fulfillment, while Cassandra and 
Veronica are doomed to be swept into an unavoidable maelstrom of domestic subjugation, it 
is Little Women that relies upon a traditional mode of story telling and The Morgesons that 
engages with radically deviant techniques. In spite of the presence of progressive politics—
the narration of Little Women, dominant yet imperceptible (we shouldn’t feel as if we’re being 
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“told” something, it should simply and unquestionably appear to be), acts with a suspiciously 
effective rhetorical acuteness. Conversely, Stoddard’s unorthodoxy is anything but 
subliminal. Her language—strange, raw, new, and disrupting, serves to expose not just the 
tropes of the “domestic novel” but also the domestic system.  
 In The Morgesons the conventions of language and the conventions of culture are not 
separate. Embedded within the often quiet chaos seems to lie the hope that the derailment 
of one predicts the derailment of the other. Dawn Henwood writes, “In Cassandra’s reality, 
social conversation consists of nothing but pretty lies” (56). Though Stoddard’s novel 
doesn’t contribute to a “narrative” of progress, her refusal to participate in the construction 
of an untruth for the purpose of pleasure is progressive in a deeply substantial way. Zagarell 
suggests that this inseparable vision of language and culture can be accounted for by 
examining Stoddard’s own conception of her life, her work, and her identity as an author. 
An inversion of the narrative of Jo, Beth, Meg and Amy who give up their artistic aspirations 
to enter into roles of womanhood, Zagarell argues that unlike many of her contemporaries 
who “told readers what to think and feel,” Elizabeth Stoddard saw herself not as a guardian 
of any particular institution, but as an artist. “She saw [her novels] in aesthetic and 
philosophical terms. She was determined to inscribe ‘truth’ in them without explanation […] 
leaving to readers the work of ascertaining just what ‘truths’ her art suggested” (284). Just as 
there is no single “truth,” Cassandra travels between households, from Surrey to Barmouth 
and Belem eliminating the possibility of a single house or home from which to center a 
doctrine. Meaning, for Stoddard, is a subjective space, one in which the consciousness of the 
individual prevails over moral prescriptions and rigid institutions. The Morgesons wants 
nothing to do with reinforcing an ideology or creating castles in the air that ultimately cannot 
be lived within. Though Stoddard may tear down the house of verbal and cultural 
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construction with her untamed and verging-on-nihilistic tendencies, we may be left in the 
rubble, but with a plentitude of open space and the raw materials for building something 
new.  
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Chapter III 
 
The Presence of Absence: Naming the Loss in Housekeeping 
 
“The Path of things is silent. Will they suffer a speaker to go with them?” 
 – Ralph Waldo Emerson (The Poet) 
 
“The household, its slippery incipience, meant that one was obliged to invent.” 
 – Ann Lauterbach (The Night Sky) 
 
 
“Where do we find ourselves?” Emerson asks. He asks after the condition of our present 
moment. We find ourselves here. We find ourselves now. Yet “here” and “now” are merely 
deictic referents—essentially meaningless until we can name what is not here, and what is 
not now. Emerson’s question is a question of history. We cannot find ourselves here, unless 
we can locate ourselves in the progression of where we have been with anticipation of where 
we are going. “We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us, which we 
seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of 
sight” (471). Here is a problem. History is not as simple as a backward glance at stairs 
climbed and boxes checked: history seems. It is an approximation—a dream of prior steps 
that cannot be climbed twice. A unidirectional ascent, each tread disappears with a foot’s 
lifting. What does this mean for “we” in the middle, “we” the seekers of a present moment 
the location of which can only be approximate?   
 Marilynne Robinson’s 1980 novel Housekeeping is about finding the location of our 
present experience after loss has rendered us lost. The novel opens with a salute to Herman 
Melville’s Ishmael. “My name is Ruth.” And like the both the Ishmael of the Old Testament 
and the Ishmael of Moby Dick, the narrator of Housekeeping is cast out from the comforts of a 
stable and ordered world in order to float adrift on “bright and sliding surfaces” (Robinson 
131) searching for the keys that might make her present comprehensible. Abandoned by an 
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absent father and the suicide of her mother, the death of her grandmother and the desertion 
of two great-aunts, Ruth and her sister Lucille’s understanding of loss has frequently been 
read as the heart of the novel. Though they grow up in a house built by their grandfather, 
where their mother and aunts were raised, they cannot escape the feeling of disorientation 
that supersedes the familiarity of a familial home.  “We had spent all our lives watching and 
listening with the constant sharp attentions of children lost in the dark. It seemed that we 
were bewilderingly lost in a landscape that, with any light at all, would be wholly familiar” 
(130). In Housekeeping, the home—a supposedly safe, ordered, and grounding place—
contains the wild uncertainties of unanchored existence. Using the house as a setting, the 
novel asks us to consider to what extent the individual is a universe unto herself and to what 
extent she is a piece—a continuation, even a repetition—of what has come before. It 
especially engages with the problem of internalizing through narrative a history that might 
seem, as all the past does, irreparably lost.  
To grapple with these questions, Housekeeping engages with a dialogue of fragments 
and wholes directly traceable to the American authors that Robinson considers her “old 
aunts and uncles” (Hedrick 1), Dickinson, Thoreau, Melville and Emerson. In as much as 
Robinson claims to be continuing a conversation with the authors of the American 
Renaissance, much has been said about isolation, loneliness and loss as it echoes and engages 
with Thoreau, Dickinson and Melville—yet we stop short of the full complexity of 
Robinson’s portrayal if Ruth is nothing but a contemporary portrait of antiquated grief—or 
if we represent Robinson’s authorial predecessors as such. Not to be overlooked in the cold, 
dark and quiet of Housekeeping slumbers the second half of the conversation, a silent joy, 
humming in the minuteness of the details, suggesting that all we have lost is only known as 
such for its capacity to be found again. Here we continue the conversation of despair with 
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reference to a capacity for completion: an Emersonian faith in roundness that posits distance 
as an illusion, and suggests that everything stems from and moves towards comprehension, 
wholeness, and truth.  
 But what does it mean to be “whole?” In Housekeeping, Ruth struggles to reconcile 
two visions of reality: the first, in which she is a mere fragment of the world she lives in, 
destined never to achieve the distance or magnitude necessary to comprehend the totality of 
its shape or the connection of its pieces. The second is a vision in which the world we see 
exists only because it is seen through the eyes of an individual who acts as a unifying 
principle—a meaning maker. The first vision concerns itself with the truth of events, actions, 
and being. The second concerns itself with perception—memory and dream—and the 
adequateness of the human consciousness to arrest, recreate, and express the instantaneous 
and constantly shifting reality of the first. How simple this novel might be, if Robinson had 
chosen to set these two ways of viewing the world in opposition to one another, making her 
main character choose and enact one way of existence, but the human experience will not be 
categorized or contained, and the braiding of these threads lends Housekeeping the subtleties 
which make the portrayal rich.  
I have found there is a desire among critics of Housekeeping to work primarily in 
oppositions, and understandably so. The novel does seem to work in dichotomies that make 
central the differences the community and the individual, of light and darkness—warmth 
and chill. Critics have read the novel as a feminist reclamation of a masculine literary canon, 
or as a way to clearly distinguish between the “constructed” and the “natural” world. 
However, in interviews Robinson herself has said, “When I write in general I try not to 
create oppositions. What I’ve tried to do whenever there are conflicts is to make both sides 
as equal as possible” (Hedrick 4). It is not that polarized readings of Robinson neglect to 
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yield important insights of specific moments within the novel, but rather that they leave half 
the novel untouched. To focus on the land, we forfeit the understanding of the realities 
beneath the surface of the lake and to dwell only in the mystery of the waters understates the 
importance of the tangible, terrestrial quotidian. By exploring the tension—for this word 
emphasizes the equality of the elements that Robinson poses against one another—between 
the fragmentary and the whole, and the arbitrary and the significant, I would like to suggest 
that there is another way to understand Ruth’s experience of an identity wavering between 
lost and found. The idea of the natural and the constructed is especially important to my 
understanding of Housekeeping, yet instead of juxtaposing the “natural” moments occurring in 
time against human perceptions of events, I refer to a passage from Emerson’s “The Poet”, 
which seems more authentic to Robinson’s vision. Though Emerson also attributes to nature 
a quality of ultimate truth, he writes, “…all men live by truth, and stand in need of 
expression. In love, in art, in avarice, in politics, in labor, in games, we study to utter our 
painful secret. The man is only half himself, the other half is his expression” (The Poet, 448). 
The lost immediacy of the actual and the omnipresence of the perceptive are two sides of 
one coin.  
In Housekeeping, Ruth centers her life around two “lost” catastrophic events. The first 
is the suicide of her mother, who drove a borrowed car off a cliff and into the Lake, and the 
second occurred before her birth, when her grandfather’s train shifted from the track of the 
bridge and careened into the same body of water. These two submerged incidents are the 
points to which Ruth returns again and again to try to make sense of all that has progressed 
since these moments. Yet, as often as Ruth speculates to the reader what this moment 
looked like, or how it felt—the very multiplicity of retellings evidences the inability to return 
with exactitude to a “true” moment. “The disaster had fallen out of sight, like the train itself” 
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(15). Ruth’s replays the unrepeatable with the compulsivity of one who knows that what is 
past is gone, but believes this unreachable moment to be a key to the present. The futility of 
reaching these events is the same futility the divers face immediately after the derailing as 
they attempt to search for the train in the rapidly freezing waters.  
After a while some of the younger boys came out on the bridge and began to 
jump off, at first cautiously and then almost exuberantly, with whoops of 
fear. […] Fragments of transparent ice wobbled on the waves they made and, 
when the water was calm again, knitted themselves up like bits of a reflection. 
One of the boys swam out forty feet from the bridge and then down to the 
old lake, feeling his way down the wall, down the blind, breathless stone, 
headfirst, and then pushing out from the foot. […] He reached down and put 
his hand on a perfectly smooth surface, parallel to the bottom, but, he 
thought, seven or eight feet above it. A window. […] He could not reach it a 
second time. The water bore him up. […] By the time he had swum back to 
the bridge and was pulled up and had told the men there where he had been, 
the water was becoming dull and opaque, like cooling wax. […] By evening 
the lake there had sealed itself over. (7-8) 
 
There is no window of time through which the event can be experienced after it has come to 
pass. Time only moves forward, affording a second-showing to no one. The water that 
obscures the wreck, like the elapse of time that obscures a past moment, is the barrier we all 
encounter in trying to make sense of prior actions and events that cannot be substantiated 
with the certitude of physicality. The transitory nature of this phenomenon can leave one 
with the painful doubt that anything occurred at all.  In describing the situation of Edmund’s 
three daughters after the accident, Robinson writes, “[If] the calm that followed it was not 
greater than the calm that came before it, it had seemed so. And the dear ordinary had 
healed as seamlessly as an image on the water” (15). There is a cruelty in the ephemeral 
nature of moments that impact life, or a family, so dramatically. To be gone is nearly to have 
never been.  
 Consider as well that the loss of an important piece of one’s identity is not 
necessarily something that is experienced concretely, or even in one’s lifetime. Ruth 
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experiences the death of her mother as a child, however, the death of her grandfather—
perhaps a psychological factor that contributes to the actions of her mother—seems to 
hover just as darkly over Ruth’s narrative, and this is a loss that was inherited rather than 
experienced. Emily Dickinson writes: 
A loss of something ever felt I –  
The first that I could recollect 
Bereft I was – of what I knew not 
Too young that any should suspect 
 
A Mourner walked among the children 
I notwithstanding went about 
As one bemoaning a Dominion 
Itself the only Prince cast out – (959, 1-8) 
 
If loss can be inherited, we can be born less than whole. In addition, if we rely on the 
synthesis and coherence of past moments to make us whole, we are all born less than whole. 
No one comes into the world without a history to precede him, and none of us have access 
to our histories with any immediacy. Referencing the biblical fall, Robinson writes on the 
universality of being cast away from a moment of foundation, “The force behind the 
movement of time is a mourning that will not be comforted. That is why the first event is 
known to have been an expulsion, and the last is hoped to be reconciliation and return” 
(192). Ruth and Dickinson lament the same loss: a loss of origin and of placement that 
ultimately negates identity.   
And yet, though the moment itself may be lost, the essence of moments can be 
redeemed through the resurrecting power of expression. In The Space of Literature, Maurice 
Blanchot uses the figure of Orpheus to illustrate the nature of loss and its relationship to 
expression. After the death of his wife, Eurydice, a deeply grieved Orpheus is granted one 
opportunity to lead her back from the underworld on the condition that he not turn back to 
look at her until they reach the living world again. Forgetting for an instant the condition of 
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this favor, Orpheus turns to face her moments before reaching the light and loses her again, 
this time forever. Blanchot emphasizes, however, the importance that this experience should 
be granted to Orpheus, the archetypal musician and artist. Blanchot writes: 
Orpheus’s error seems then to lie in the desire which moves him to see and 
possess Eurydice, he whose destiny is only to sing of her. He is Orpheus only 
in the song: he cannot have any relation to Eurydice except within the hymn. 
(172)  
 
What is lost cannot be brought back whole from the past— it can only be recreated in the 
expressions of the individual. The individual in turn, is found in the expression. Orpheus’ 
being is realized through his action; he is himself because of what he creates. An echo of 
Emerson—we are half ourselves, and half our expression. Expression however, it not 
something limited to music, poetry or intentional “art.” Housekeeping emphasizes the 
importance of memory and dream as storytelling in the absence of actualities. Even when we 
do not set out consciously to write or tell a story, our psyche drifts into realms of narrative. 
In the wake of events that cannot be found, Ruth is fixated on the psychological retellings of 
what cannot be re-experienced. Robinson writes: 
There is so little to remember of anyone—an anecdote, a conversation at 
table. But every memory is turned over and over again, every word, however 
chance, written in the heart in hope that memory will fulfill itself, and 
become flesh, and that the wanderers will find a way home, and the 
perished, whose lack we always feel, will step through the door finally and 
stroke our hair with dreaming, habitual fondness, not having meant to keep 
us waiting long. (196) 
 
 Just as Orpheus is left with his song, through the power of memory, what is lost has 
the potential to return. In the psychological reliving of moments in memory or dream, the 
individual writes her story and recreates lost presence. Yet, as much as Ruth seems to 
understand the power her memories have to create, she cannot curb an inherent dread that 
the process of recreating events only thrusts the truth of those events further beneath the 
surface. Like the water, whose still surface reflects the sky above it and not the secrets it 
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entombs, memory can show us only a reflection of ourselves in a present moment, and not 
the event we seek to remember. Ruth says, “Sometime [Lucille and I] would try to remember 
our mother but more and more we disagreed and even quarreled about what she had been 
like” (109). The longer the girls are in the care of Sylvie, their mother’s sister, the image of 
their present situation siphons away the authenticity of the past.  
As I watched Sylvie, she reminded me of my mother more and more. There 
was such similarity, in fact, in the structure of cheek and chin, and the texture 
of hair, that Sylvie began to blur the memory of my mother, and then to 
displace it. Soon it was Sylvie who would look up startled, regarding me from 
a vantage of memory in which she had no place. (53) 
 
The dilemma for Ruth is that she can have the past, as long as she is willing to construct it 
for herself and accept the uncertainties of what she cannot know. For this reason, though 
Housekeeping is flooded with memory, there is a grief associated with it, a desire not to 
remember if it can save the integrity of a moment. However, this renunciation is nearly 
impossible, and the connection between the present and the past, what remains and what 
has perished, cannot be broken. Sylvie becomes Ruth’s mother in the present in the same 
way that Ruth’s mother becomes Sylvie in the memory and in the dream. These moments 
merge in a consciousness that desires to hold all instants.  
 The power of a condition to suggest its opposite allows for the rebirth that memory 
can offer. This is not a choice that is always consciously made, but rather a characteristic of 
the minds of sentient creatures. Loss is not an isolated experience. There are two crucial 
movements in the story of Orpheus—the descent and the return. The descent, the 
movement toward the loss than cannot be attained, tends to overshadow the return to the 
land of the living, but the ascent is no less important. Blanchot writes: 
From day’s perspective, the descent into the Underworld, the movement 
down into vain depths, is in itself excessive. It is inevitable that Orpheus 
transgresses the law which forbids him to ‘turn back,’ for he had already 
violated it with his first steps toward the shades. This remark implies that 
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Orpheus has in fact never ceased to be turned toward Eurydice: he saw her 
invisible, he touched her intact, in her shadowy absence, in that veiled 
presence which did not hide her absence, which was the presence of her 
infinite absence. (172) 
 
An inversion occurs over the process of Orpheus’ journey. Eurydice’s “intact,” lost form no 
longer has the presence that the living being would possess, and her absence in realm of 
“day” takes on new reality. Though Orpheus returns without the embodied Eurydice, he 
does not return empty handed. For those of us to whom the underworld is only a metaphor, 
impossible to physically traverse, the transition from the presence of presence to the no less 
real presence of absence is especially important. Ruth says: 
For need can blossom into all the compensation it requires. To crave and to 
have are as like as a thing and its shadow. For when does a berry break upon 
the tongue as sweetly as when one longs to taste it, and when is the taste 
refracted into so many hues and savors of ripeness and earth, and when do 
our senses know anything so utterly as when we lack it? And here again is a 
foreshadowing—the world will be made whole. For to wish for a hand on 
one’s hair is all but to feel it. So whatever we may lose, very craving gives it 
back to us again. (153) 
 
In Moby Dick, Melville writes, “there is no quality in this world that is not what it is merely by 
contrast. Nothing exists in itself” (Melville 850). The significance Ruth attaches to the role 
and importance of the mother is defined by no longer having her. Ruth’s expression of her 
mother through memory and dream contributes perhaps an even larger component of the 
identity of her mother than an embodiment could, for it is the loss that makes her truly 
notice the specificities. The stagnation in waking life that Ruth experiences as she is pulled 
forward by time and backward by memory is not so much a pause, as an expansion of a 
present moment that requires space to encompass not the loss, but the growth of perception 
that the loss necessitates.  
 In these moments, Ruth is the architect of her past, grasping splinters from fleeting 
moments and allowing the suggestions the fragments make to become the building supplies 
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she requires. Dispersed throughout the novel is a certain thought-experiment that comes to 
read as a refrain. In conveying to the reader the unsubstantiated past of her family that must 
have lead to this point of present, what a third person narrator would simply state as true, 
our first person narrator poses as a trail of imaginative logic. The reader is asked to 
participate in the same logical wanderings that Ruth must walk. She begins to explain her 
grandmother hanging laundry out to dry. 
Say there were two or three inches of hard old snow on the ground, […] and 
say she stooped breathlessly […], and say that when she had pinned three 
corners to the lines it began to billow and leap in her hands […]. That wind! 
She would say […]. Edmund would carry buckets and a trowel […], She and 
Edmund would climb until they were wet with sweat. […] The wind would be 
sour with stale snow and death and pine pitch and wildflowers. (16, emphasis 
mine.) 
 
In her essay on poetic experience, the poet Ann Lauterbach writes, “By forgetting I have 
found a method by which the materials of the actual become materials for the possible” 
(Lauterbach 3). From her loss, Ruth weaves scenes into a tapestry of the past situated 
somewhere between memory and imagination. When she tells the reader the story of her 
grandmother, the narrative is no less real than if it were fact. These things happened. There 
is no way to see them happen, or to know the events by our senses, but we know they have 
come to pass because we have said them, and called them into a particular form of being. To 
say this is to express this, and expression according to Emerson, is half of all that exists. 
After we have “said” a certain thing, what builds onto the foundation of our own creation 
comes naturally. To follow the semantic logic, if we say a particular thing, another thing would 
happen. Ruth never asserts that Edmund, her grandfather, did anything—what did happen 
lies in darkness at the bottom of the lake. For one in the present to speculate about the past, 
everything that can exist does on the condition of its expression—a no less valid form of 
experience.  
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 Yet, still we might feel the desire to keep the enactment of events and their 
expression separate. Emerson suggests that this separation is unnecessary and untrue to the 
human experience of events. Knitting expression-as-event to the event itself, Emerson 
suggests that the two types mingle more than they mirror. The poet, for Emerson, is a god-
like man for his power to discern the truth of nature—what is, or has been. In giving this 
truth to others, he immortalizes it. He writes of poetry: 
But the poet names the thing because he sees it, or comes one step nearer to it 
than any other. This expression, or naming, is not art, but a second nature, 
grown out of the first, as a leaf out of a tree. […] Genius is the activity which 
repairs the decays of things, whether wholly or partly of a material and finite 
kind. (The Poet 457) 
 
There is a scene in Housekeeping in which most of the town becomes submerged by a flood, 
and a particular image which resonates with Emerson’s description of poetry.  
The water shone more brilliantly than the sky, and while we watched, a tall 
elm tree fell slowly across the road. From crown to root, half of it vanished 
in the brilliant light. […] The water was so calm that the sunken half of the 
fallen tree was replaced by the mirrored image of the half trunk and limbs 
that remained above the water. (Robinson 62-63) 
 
The tree, though fragmented, sliced in half by the water that obscures the ground, remains 
whole—perhaps even more whole in its symmetry—because of the reflection in the water. 
Water, at once obscuring and creating, completes the image of the natural. It mirrors the 
image literally, but is also analogous to perception: our mental faculties are subject to the 
same ebb and flow of rivers, tides, and floods. “Why should not the symmetry and truth that 
modulate these, glide into our spirits, and we participate in the invention of nature? (The Poet 
459). We use the world around us, the fragments of our experiences, and convert them into 
symbols that we use to synthesize the experiences that have eluded our grasps. Trees become 
stories in order that we might see trees again. Emerson writes of symbols: 
For, though life is great, and fascinates, and absorbs, -- and though all men 
are intelligent of the symbols through which it is named, -- yet they cannot 
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originally use them. We are symbols, and inhabit symbols; workman, work, 
and tools, words and things, birth and death, all are emblems; but we 
sympathize with the symbols, and, being infatuated with the economical uses 
of things, we do not know that they are thoughts. The poet, by an ulterior 
intellectual perception, gives them power which makes their old use 
forgotten, and puts eyes, and a tongue, into every dumb and inanimate 
object. (The Poet 456) 
 
Though Housekeeping is saturated with images of the natural world—the lake, the hills, the 
snow, the ice—the unnatural world, the world of objects within the household, is just as 
prevalent. Robinson takes care to impart to the reader the immensity of the scale of the 
universe within the home. Compiled here is an abbreviated “packing list” of the things that 
are found in the house. There are wading boots, a fringed rug, a radio, Good Housekeeping, a 
Chinese vase, a piano, cinnamon sticks, quilts, photographs, unreturned library books, egg 
shells, a wasps nest, whitened shoes, an apron, a tea-strainer, a pull-down ironing board, 
issues of Reader’s Digest, snow boots and skates, a box of candles, newspaper wrapped 
Christmas ornaments, a wood stove, a hot-water bottle, a suitcase, a lamp, stamps, a straw-
hat, a periodic table of elements, kitchen spoons, Monopoly, lace curtains, a bag of 
clothespins, a deck of cards, a china cup, a vanity, a couch, cuttings of philodendron, tea-
towels, bats and barn-swallows, a plum-colored davenport, a defrocked doll, a brown pearl, a 
box of hair-pins, a wardrobe, a chest, balls of twine, socks, a wax angel, a black velvet 
pincushion, National Geographic, a frying pan, plates in detergent boxes, stacked china, 
dishtowels, brimstone tea, towers of tin cans and bottles, a dictionary full of pressed flowers, 
a sewing machine, Ivanhoe and Wuthering Heights, grocery string, a diary, stacks of newspaper, 
cobwebs and cats, artificial flowers, a box of cornflakes, a wide-toothed comb, a roll of tape, 
a flashlight, soap-boxes and shoe-boxes, almanacs, Sears’ catalogues, telephone books, a 
shovel, lampshades, piano-scarves, doilies, a saved lock of hair, a hatbox, and a grey purse.  
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 There is a cadence in the specificity, and logic to the arbitrariness. Who among us 
does not see our own home, the home of our mothers, or grandmothers, in these objects? 
Marilynne Robinson, in naming the trifles nearly always overlooked in any home, has gotten 
to the heart of just how many things we collect. Events pass, but they leave us with 
souvenirs. At best, we hope for the power of Emerson’s poet. We hope to make things 
speak. Ruth describes her grandmother in the garden. “She burrowed her hand under a 
potato plant and felt gingerly for the new potatoes in their dry net of roots, smooth as eggs. 
She put them in her apron and walked back to the house thinking, What have I seen, what 
have I seen” (19). Objects, at their most powerful are hoped to catalyze an urgency for 
naming experience. I have seen this thing, I have touched this thing, it has mattered, it has 
been noticed, and it has suggested to me a way of comprehending what I have experienced. 
Emily Dickinson writes: 
This was a Poet – It is That 
Distills amazing sense 
From ordinary Meanings – 
And Attar so immense 
 
From the familiar species 
That perished by the Door – 
We wonder it was not Ourselves 
Arrested it – before – (448, 1-8) 
 
 It is hoped that by arresting an object it will become a symbol, something at once 
physical enough to hold and transcendent enough to contain aspects of ephemeral truths. 
Ruth’s grandfather, Edmund, would revel in finding trophies of the new spring. “He would 
pick up eggshells, a bird’s wing, a jawbone, the ashy fragment of a wasp’s nest. […] He 
would peer at them as if he could read them, and pocket them as if he could own them. This 
is death in my hand, this is ruin in my breast pocket” (Robinson, 17). When objects are 
imbued with symbolism, they take on an illusion of permanence that serves as a remedy 
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against the ever-present threat of forgetting experience. Hannah Arendt writes, “Work and 
its product, the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon the 
futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time” (Arendt 30). Robinson 
writes:  
If one should be shown odd fragments arranged on a silver tray and be told, 
‘That is a splinter from the True Cross, and that is a nail pairing dropped by 
Barabbas, and that is a bit of lint from under the bed where Pilate’s wife 
dreamed her dream,’ the very ordinariness of the things would recommend 
them. Every spirit passing through the world fingers the tangible and mars 
the mutable, and finally has to come to look and not to buy. So shoes are 
worn and hassocks are sat upon and finally everything is left where it was and 
the spirit passes on […]. So Fingerbone, or such relics of it as showed above 
the mirroring waters, seemed fragments of the quotidian held up to our 
wondering attention, offered somehow as proof of their own significance. 
(73) 
 
In the wake of catastrophe where life and origin are lost, these objects that are left contain a 
sacred power to hold the world in place. They assure and remind us of the reality of a single 
moment in “the undifferentiated past” (41), and come to take on the human qualities of 
those who have been lost, and even give us back aspects of our own missing identities. It is 
for this reason that the ordinary expands its economical use, and takes on nearly mystical 
significance. Lucille pours through magazines of hairstyles and patterns for new dresses, 
seeking out the not-yet-acquired objects with which she will rebuild herself. Ruth, looking 
backward at an evasive past, directs her search toward the house. “It seemed that something 
I had lost might be found in Sylvie’s house” (124). Lucille is looking for futurity offered by 
new things, Ruth is looking for the history offered by old. Ruth recounts: 
My grandmother had kept, in the bottom drawer of the chest of drawers, a 
collection of things, memorabilia, balls of twine, Christmas candles, and odd 
socks. Lucille and I used to delve in this drawer. Its contents were so 
randomly assorted, yet so neatly arranged, that we felt some large significance 
might be behind the collection as a whole. (90) 
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The drawer houses anxiety that is characteristic of Ruth’s relationship with her larger 
objective history. Objects have the potential to speak, or at least to act as keys to unlock the 
conscious mind’s power to speak, order, and express events—but this doesn’t mean they 
always do. In objects, we hope for certainty—the certainty of a thing that lasts, and the 
certainty of a story. In this respect, all the objects of Ruth’s life are valuable for their 
potential to help her find what she has lost, and for their potential to be ordered.  
There would be a general reclaiming of fallen buttons and misplaced 
spectacles, of neighbors and kin, till time and error and accident were 
undone, and the world became comprehensible and whole. […] What are all 
these fragments for, if not to be knit up finally? (92) 
 
But the hopeful feeling of significance only exists in contrast to the randomness of the 
drawer, and the fact that as of yet, the buttons and spectacles have not been reclaimed. They 
are still fallen and misplaced. The whole that might be assembled is a flash of light in a room 
that is overwhelmingly shadowed by the unspoken might not. In this case, despite their 
potential to speak, objects remain silent, acting as better representations of the loss itself 
than what was desired to be remembered. The potential for the drawer to become a whole is 
another way of saying that its immediate condition is fragmented and incomplete. What does 
a candlestick really have? What does a ball of twine mean? The possibility for these 
inconsequential trifles to become lucid necessitates Ruth to hang onto a vast universe of 
“things” that also ensure that she is forever swimming against a current of randomness, 
meaninglessness, and the embodiment of loss. By holding onto all these objects, the absence 
of completion remains the foremost presence.  
 The futility of this struggle puts one at odds against the very nature of our selves. 
Our consciousness and our capacity for memory necessitates that we create narratives, 
deeply inadequate though they often seem. Emerson writes on the death of his son, “Well, 
souls never touch their objects. An innavigable sea washes with silent waves between us and 
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the things we aim at and converse with. Grief too will make us idealists. […] I cannot get it 
nearer to me” (Experience 473). The incapacity for consciousness to ever touch the forces 
that shape it can leave one with an incredible sense of isolation and powerlessness. The 
character in Housekeeping who seems to know this best is Ruth’s Aunt Sylvie. “Sylvie, on her 
side, inhabited a millennial present. To her the deteriorations of things were always a fresh 
surprise, a disappointment not to be dwelt on” (94). With a fierce denial of the incapability 
of her consciousness, Lucille disavows the past and moves forward aggressively. Ruth 
stagnates under her compulsion to look-backward. Sylvie, perceiving that both searches for 
meaning are ultimately useless, becomes almost an object herself without past or future.  
 Much has been written on the character of Sylvie and the breaching of human 
boundaries. Ethereal Sylvie, with her proclivity for darkness, coldness, and water over the 
more life-conducive elements of light, heat, and land, seems to wander effortlessly between 
the realms of the living and the lost. Christine Carver, in “Nothing Left to Lose: 
Housekeeping’s Strange Freedoms” associates Sylvie with the part of Ruth’s consciousness that 
longs for death as a way of rejoining the whole from which she feels outcast. “Because Sylvie 
represents all that this family cannot articulate or resolve, Ruth’s complete acceptance of her 
suggests that she has surrendered her identity to a grief without time [or] space” (Carver, 
126). Carver’s reading of Sylvie suggests that Sylvie’s way of coping with loss and 
displacement is not to try to find centering locating narratives, but rather to give up an 
essentially human quality—the desire to make meaning at all.  
 This is Sylvie’s concern: in a world where millions of fragments are left behind when 
a family is broken, why should people be the only ones to follow our losses to the 
underworld, swimming upstream against the changes and losses that are thrust upon us?  
Sylvie, as close a model to non-being as mortally possible, engenders these thoughts in 
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Ruth’s mind. “Why must we be left, the survivors picking among flotsam, among the small, 
unnoticed, unvalued clutter that was all that remained when they vanished, that only 
catastrophe made notable?” (116). When individual identity is so entwined with the thing or 
person that has vanished, what are the survivors but another variety of flotsam? It may seem 
as if we too are capable of becoming objects without symbolism, the signifier devoid of a 
signified. Sylvie’s ghostly ability to permeate and dissolve boundaries, while maintaining just 
enough substance to keep from fading into non-humanity entirely makes her one of the 
most remarkable characters of contemporary literature. Under Sylvie’s influence, Ruth begins 
to experiment with Sylvie’s method of matching loss that is taken with a loss that is given. 
She describes the night she and Lucille spent in the woods: 
[Lucille] would say I fell asleep, but I did not. I simply let the darkness in the 
sky become coextensive with the darkness in my skull and bowels and bones. 
[…] Darkness is the only solvent. […] it seemed to me that there need be not 
relic, remnant, margin, residue, memento, bequest, memory, thought, track, 
or trace, if only the darkness could be perfect and permanent. (116) 
 
Nothing in this world is permanent. Things and people come and go with a timing that is 
beyond our control. By allowing the darkness of inside and outside to pass freely and 
without barrier is a way of striving for completion that is otherwise impossible. What is not 
wrested from us, we will freely give. After all, “It is better to have nothing, for at last even 
our bones will fall. It is better to have nothing” (Robinson 159). Emphasizing this moment 
in the novel, Carver argues that Ruth’s search for identity is ultimately relinquished when she 
chooses to follow Sylvie into a life of transient drifting. This is a crucial moment in the 
novel, however, this reading is one that places too great an emphasis on the cold and dark 
elements of Housekeeping. If Robinson dwells on the pursuit of unconsciousness that the 
teachings of Sylvie encourage, it is to illuminate the machinations of consciousness that 
ultimately will not be suppressed in Ruth.  
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 Though the desire to eliminate lack and wanting by becoming object-like is a 
powerful one, it is the presence of divinity within the human being—the essential 
unobjectiveness of consciousness that cannot be eradicated—that Robinson celebrates in a 
quiet and contemplative way. Thomas Gardiner makes a case for this in “Enlarging 
Loneliness,” a reading of Housekeeping that relies on Emily Dickinson’s aesthetics and 
philosophical foot-paths.  Gardener calls upon this passage from Housekeeping: 
Because, once alone, it is impossible to believe that one could ever have been 
otherwise. Loneliness is an absolute discovery. When one looks from inside at 
a lighted window, or looks from above at the lake, one sees the image of 
oneself among trees and sky—the deception is obvious, but flattering all the 
same. When one looks from the darkness into the light, however, one sees all 
the difference between here and there. (157-8) 
 
Gardener writes, “Having been out in the dark, Ruth knows there is something beyond the 
limits of the lit world: call it a ‘Druidic Difference’, a world ‘not me, not like me, not mine’” 
(15). Playing with the boundaries of how far one can move into realms without light and 
sustenance, an act embodied by the night spent on the lake with Sylvie, does not facilitate a 
merging of elements. Quite oppositely, it exaggerates the characteristics of human 
consciousness that prohibit merging from occurring. In lighted, and warm spaces, our own 
body temperature goes unnoticed. Like the perceptively increased luminosity of a dim light 
in total blackness, we only consider the heat of our own bodies when it is thrown into 
contrast against a cold so inhibiting that it must be inhuman. For this reason, though the 
darkness tempts Ruth into a fantasy of non-being, it is actually the illusion of warmth and 
light within the house that risks eliminating Ruth. The light threatens perilous invisibility 
while the darkness offers salvation through contrast.  
 When Melville writes, “[No] man can ever feel his own identity aright except his eyes 
be closed; as if darkness indeed the proper element of our essences, though light be more 
congenial to our clayey part” (851), he points explicitly to this paradox. Though we see 
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ourselves most clearly in the dark—it is not a condition conducive for nurturing the life that 
we find. We live in houses. In a world where we are not objects, where consciousness 
envelops us in heat and divides us from the chill of meaninglessness, how will we decide to 
keep house? Houses are passed down from mother to daughter, bequeathed and cluttered 
museums of unarchived moments and the ghosts of events. Our birthrights are contained 
between four walls, a collected disconnectedness that aspires to history. Even Sylvie, unable 
to loose herself from the infinite anchors of objects and things considers “accumulation to 
be the essence of housekeeping” (180).  Yet the “storage of cans and newspapers [are] things 
utterly without value”—and perhaps not so different from any of the other objects that 
remain silent in the impending accusation of their own arbitrariness.  
  Ruth’s grandmother was a religious woman who conceived of Heaven as “some 
plain house where one went in an was greeted by respectable people and was shown to a 
room where everything one had ever lost or put aside was gathered together, waiting” (10). 
The remarkable transformation of objects into history is not a metamorphosis meant for the 
living—it is precisely the insular quality of being alive that prohibits us from finding 
community among mute and static things. Invisible to the eye, mattresses grow heavier with 
microscopic fragments of dust and the shedding of our own cellular pieces. Houses grow 
heavy with the unsloughed remnants of our own passage through time.  
 In the house is a wardrobe, painted by Ruth’s grandfather with pictures and scenes 
economically wiped out and painted white. “Each of these designs had been thought better 
of and painted out, but over years the white paint had absorbed them, floated them up just 
beneath the surface” (90). If the object contains a story, it can only suggest from underneath 
opaque surfaces what it cannot tell. What can we do with impermeable membranes and 
masked shapes? The wardrobe grows thick and unmovable with its own obstructed 
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expression and solidifies, tomblike, in the corners of the places we live. It is amazing that the 
structures of our houses do not petrify under the conditions of their dead histories.  
[For] the appearance of relative solidity in my grandmother’s house was 
deceptive. It was an impression created by the piano, and the scrolled couch, 
and the bookcases full of almanacs and Kipling and Defoe. For all the 
appearance these things gave of substance and solidity, they might better be 
considered a dangerous weight on a frail structure. (Robinson, 159)  
 
Here Ruth suggests that there is something essential within the house actually in opposition 
to the lifelessness of things. Our real homes are more than the sum of our infinite objects, 
and accumulation risks the suffocation of this essence lost amid the clutter. To lose 
something within one’s home is a maddening experience. The certainty of the lost object’s 
existence paired with the habit and acculturation of experience in a familiar place can make a 
perfectly obvious misplacement hopelessly invisible. We stop seeing the objects themselves; 
even in our present moment we see the memory of how we expect them to be. I cannot find 
a ring I’ve misplaced because it should be on a table where I always put it. In actuality, it is in 
plain sight on top of a dresser mere feet away, but my expectations have blinded me to the 
reality of my experience. In my waking present moment, I am locked into my past. No less 
invisible is the mislaid essence of the home for which Ruth searches when she says, “it 
seemed that something I had lost might be found in Sylvie’s house” (124). 
 In this situation, no amount of cleaning or organizing can call forth the specter of 
the house. How will we keep our houses? We will burn them down.  
For even things lost in a house abide like forgotten sorrows and incipient 
dreams, and many household things are of purely sentimental value, like the 
dim coil of thick hair, saved from my grandmother’s girlhood, which was 
kept in a hatbox on top of the wardrobe, along with my mother’s gray purse. 
In the equal light of disinterested scrutiny such things are not themselves. 
They are transformed into pure object, and are horrible, and must be burned. 
(209) 
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The dominant reading of the end of the novel is one of renunciation. By burning the house 
Ruth is read to have given up her history, the normative expectations of domestic 
womanhood, a desire for permanence, and ultimately her identity— I would like to suggest 
that the opposite is true. Ruth is not burning down her home, she is burning down her 
house. By burning the objects, she’s liberating their essence. By asserting power over the 
objective world, she is embracing the subjective world in a somber celebration of 
consciousness and individual identity. Ruth commits arson against not simply the house, but 
a former identity of loss defined by unreachable objective truths. She knows now that the 
fragments will not combine into a whole, but rather each fragment will become it’s own 
whole, herself most importantly. “Every last thing would turn to flame and ascend, so 
cleanly would the soul of the house escape” (212).  
 After the burning of the house, Sylvie and Ruth decide to flee the town they only 
way they can—they cross the bridge over the lake by foot and hop a train moving west. To 
read the burning of the house as an act of destruction is to ignore the final Orphic turn the 
novel makes. It is as if Robinson were rewriting the fate of Eurydice, “I followed after Sylvie 
with slow, long, dancers steps […].  I could barely see Sylvie. I could barely see where I put 
my feet. Perhaps it was only the certainty that she was in front of me, and that I need only 
put my foot directly before me” (211). Both escape because neither looks back. Like 
Thoreau walking westward—in the east lies only the past—the burning of the house sets 
both women in a direction of futurity that neither has traveled before. Ruth for the first time 
feels certainty. She has stopped looking for what can be seen, and has begun to rely upon 
what she can sense.  
 In consequence of this pivotal turning from the past to the future, the final section 
of the novel diverges from everything that has come before; the novel ends in the present 
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tense. A return to Emerson’s question: Where do we find ourselves? Ruth says, “I know my life 
would be much different if I could ever say, This I have learned from my senses, while that I 
have merely imagined” (216). This is not the lament of an individual—this is a condition of 
existence. Dream delivers us to dream, and there is no end to illusion. A grandfather’s accident, a 
mother’s decision, a grandmother’s passing, the great aunts’ refusal, a sister’s divergence: 
“All this is fact. Fact explains nothing. On the contrary, it is fact that requires explanation” 
(217). And so Ruth, survived from the wreck, explains. To this point, she has told us what 
she thinks she knows, growing the fragments, knitting a story that is half itself and half its 
expression. However, once here in the present, the real wholeness comes from her ability 
not simply to construct what has been, but what is being and will be. Objects that are lost 
within sight are found when we can perceive—and create—our present. Ruth speculates on 
the fate of the house while she wanders with Sylvie: 
We cannot see [the house] from the tracks. Someone is living there. Someone 
has pruned the apple trees and taken out the dead ones and restrung the 
clothesline and patched the shed roof. Someone plants sunflowers and giant 
dahlias at the foot of the garden. I imagine it is Lucille. (216)  
 
Seen this way, objective truths no longer paralyze Ruth, turning her into a pillar of salt as she 
anxiously scans her past. She cannot see the house—she does not know. Yet, someone is 
living there. Not only is someone living there, but someone is living there elaborately, and 
that someone is Lucille. This is an authorship of the present that does not rely upon facts—
which mean so little in the end—but rather upon truths that are our own. Emerson writes: 
Doubt not, O poet, but persist. Say, ‘It is in me, and shall out.’ Stand there, 
baulked and dumb, stuttering and stammering, hissed and hooted, stand and 
strive, until, at last, rage draw out of thee that dream-power which every night 
shows thee is thine own. (Emerson 467). 
 
Doubt always lingers. Doubts of origins, doubts of facts, doubts of purpose, doubts of self. 
We question our experience every day. What have I seen, what have I seen? But this is why we 
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sing the songs and tell our tales. Housekeeping leaves us with a final scene, as real as it is 
dreamed.  
Imagine Lucille in Boston, at a table in a restaurant, waiting for a friend. She 
is tastefully dressed—wearing, say, a tweed suit with an amber scarf at the 
throat to draw attention to the red in her darkening hair. Her water glass has 
left two-thirds of a ring on the table, and she works at completing the circle 
with her thumbnail. Sylvie and I do not flounce in the door, […] we do not sit 
down, […] my mother, likewise, is not there, […] My grandfather, with his 
hair combed flat against his brow, does not examine the menu […]. We are 
nowhere in Boston. [Lucille] will never find us there, […] the perimeters of our 
wandering are nowhere. No one watching this woman […] could know how 
her thoughts are thronged by our absence, or know how she does not watch, 
does not listen, does not wait, does not hope, and always for me and Sylvie. (219, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Do not, is not, does not, are nowhere, will never. Before not, nowhere, and never are do, is, 
does, and are. Before any of these things can “be not” they must “be.” In order to see this 
scene then, to know what is not, we imagine every negated detail occurring. In the moment 
that Sylvie does not flounce through the door, we see her walk in. We know nothing except 
through contrast, and in her absence, she will appear. As thinking is not distinguishable from 
dreaming, these stories complete each other and neither is untrue. Absence is presence, and 
stories—the substitutes for events—become our truths. Truths become wholes, always 
fragments, always complete. Where do we find ourselves? Not and always in a house, not and 
always in a town, not and always in the lake, not and always in a family, not and always in our 
words, not and always in the mind.  
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